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Much has transpired since the early development of the American trade union
movement. Less than a million of the nation's 29 million gainfully employed popula-
tion were unionized in 1900;1 today union membership stands at approximately
18.1 million.2 Union wealth was minimal until about 1942;1 estimates today place
1 Clague, The American Worker and American Industry, 71 MONTHLY LABOR REvIEw
11 (1950).
2 Cohany, Union Membership, 1958, 83 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 4 (1960). Union
membership today is also often a prerequisite to the acquisition and retention of employ-
ment. Under the LMRA § 8(a) (3), however, the closed shop is illegal. Hence it would
appear that union membership would not be a prerequisite to the acquisition of employment.
But such is not always the case. See, e.g., Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 625, 320 P.2d 494 (1958). Further, dosed shop provisions
were found in approximately 4 per cent of 1,162 collective bargaining contracts recently sur-
veyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, although it should be noted the agreements were
principally concerned with intra-state activity not subject to the LMRA. On the other hand,
the survey revealed that 74 per cent of the agreements provided for the union shop, clear-
ly indicating that union membership is often a prerequisite, at least, to retaining employ-
ment. Union Security Provisions in Major Union Contracts, 1958-59, 82 MONTHLY LABOR
654
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its total value at nearly $34 billion,4 and union welfare and pension plans cover one
half the population of the United States.5
Paralleling the factual growth of the trade union movement has been a change
in legal attitudes. Unions were first suppressed, then promoted. Today an attitude
of supervision is developing and collective bargaining, once seen as an invasion of
individual freedom, has become the cornerstone of the nation's industrial policy.6
Recent events, however, have raised questions which probe to the very heart
of this commitment to collective bargaining. National attention was focused on
the steel industry even before the expiration of the contract on June 30, 1959, and
the beginning of the strike two weeks later. By December 5, the chairman of the
National Labor Relations Board spoke of a breakdown in collective bargaining, a
breakdown which had cost the steel worker $1,750,000,000, the industry $1.5 bil-
lion, and the government $1.6.7 Before the dispute was settled on January 5, the
Vice-President of the United States had personally intervened in the conflict, and
the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of the constitutionality of the emergency
strike provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act."
Two issues seemed central to the dispute, inflation and work rules. The settle-
ment resolved neither,9 and prospects are that similar questions will soon result in
a national railway strike.10 The seeming failure to find, through normal channels,
solutions to the problems posed by the strike raises doubt, in some quarters, of
the validity of collective bargaining as a viable method of resolving industrial
conflict.
It is the purpose of this survey, then, first, to review the history of the Ameri-
can commitment to collective bargaining, and, second, to outline the present legal
framework designed to achieve industrial accord through governmental interven-
tion in, and supervision of, the collective bargaining process.
I. Historical Background
A. The Period of Formation
1. Early Background
While the evolution of the modern labor union is traceable to the industrializa-
RVIEW 1348, 1349 (1959). This situation should be contrasted with the "yellow dog"
contract era. See generally, Lieberman, Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. Mitchell: The
"Yellow Dog" Contract (1907-1917), in READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 469-76 (2d. ed. 1956).
3 Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, AMERICAN FEDERATIONISTS, July, 1954,
p. 10.
4 It has been estimated that it will continue to increase until it reaches $80 billion.
Estimates also place total annual contributions at $9 billion and benefits at $5 billion. Le-
vitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 827, 828 (1958).
5 SUBCOMMITTEE ON WELFARE AND PENSION FUNDS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, FINAL REPORT ON WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN INVESTIGA-
TION, S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1956).
6 The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in the United States exceeds
150,000. Cohany, supra note 2, at 9. These agreements in many ways have a greater sig-
nificance to the average worker than congressional legislation. In a challenge to traditional
legal thinking, one judge, in NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 638 (3d
Cir. 1940), described them as
a statement of principles and rules for the orderly government of the
employer-employee relationship in the future. This . . . becomes, as it
were, the industrial constitution of the enterprise . . . . They not only
provide standards by which industrial disputes may be adjusted, but they
add dignity to the position of labor and remove the feeling on the part
of the worker that he is a mere pawn in industry subject to the arbitrary
power of the employer.
7 South Bend Tribune, Dec. 5, 1959, p. 2, col. 1.
8 United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
9 A wage increase was granted, and the issue of work rules was submitted to a joint
committee to make, at a later date, non-binding recommendations.
10 Cohany, supra noto 2.
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tion of the manufacturing process and the attendant chasm between owner and
worker,"' it would be erroneous to say that concerted activity among laborers to
improve their lot is an invention of the "industrial man." As early as 1548 in
England it was deemed necessary to make criminal "conspiracies" among "victual-
lers," "handicraftsmen," and "labourers." Apparently they were engaging in agree-
ments to sell only at "unreasonable prices," to labor only a certain number of hours
per day, or to complete only a certain amount of work per day.
12
In this country, concerted activity among laborers to improve their economic
position appeared as early as the 17th century.13 For instance, twice in 1659 the
bakers of New York went on strike to win from the burgomasters a more favorable
wage.' 4 The earliest American example of labor organization, in a stricter sense,
is provided by the journeymen tailors of New York, who in 1758 combined to work
at a certain rate.'5 In 1778 the printers of the same city took a similar course of
action.1 6
In the period immediately following the American Revolution, labor, for the
first time, turned to a more permanent type of trade organization.
Among the early strikes of the post-Revolutionary era one of the most
notable was that of the New York shoemakers in 1785 for higher wages ....
After a strike lasting three weeks both sides withdrew their demands ....
Labor union activity in Philadelphia in this period surpassed that in New
York. In 1786 the journeymen printers went on strike to protest a reduc-
tion in wages and passed a resolution of joint support for the duration
of the strike - probably the first instance on record of a union strike-
benefit fund. . . . Following the organization in 1789 of the Philadelphia
Society of Master Cordwainers, the journeymen in the same trade formed
in 1794 a union known as the "Federal Society" to protect themselves
against "scab Labor." On at least three occasions before the end of the
century they went on strike for higher wages.lr
This period of formation carried through the first quarter of the 19th century.'
_For the first time organizations comprised solely of journeymen, and concerned
primarily with the advancement of the economic interests of the employee, asserted
themselves. 9
2. The Conspiracy Doctrine
As these "unions" gathered momentum in the early years of the 19th century,
11 "The modern labor movement is, of course, distinct from anything that had evolved
before the industrial era, being primarily the struggle of the newly evolved wage earning
class to improve its economic status." CUMMINS & DEVYVER, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (3d ed. 1947). As to the effect of the separation of the worker from
the owner, see YODER, LABOR EcoNOMIcs AND LABOR PROBLEMS 79 (1933).
12 GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 13 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
13 MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 156-60 (1946).
14 Id. at 161.
15 Labor conflicts of the era are reflected in articles in New York Journal, April 7, 1768.
16 Foreshadowed a decade earlier in disputes in the same city. See New York Royal
Gazette, Nov. 14, 1768.
17 MORRIS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 200-01.
18 MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 18-23 (1945).
19 The Philadelphia shoemakers organized in 1792 and although the so-
ciety lived only a year, a second organization, formed in 1794 under
the name of Federal Society of Journeymen Cordwainers, maintained its
existence until 1806. The carpenters and cordwainers of Boston organized
in 1793 and 1794, respectively, the printers of New York in 1794 and of
Philadelphia in 1802, and the shoemakers of Pittsburgh and the printers
of Boston in 1809. During the period 1810-1815 printers' societies were
also formed in Albany, Washington, and New Orleans, and a continuous
organization was maintained in Baltimore between 1800 and 1805. The
bakers, tailors and other groups affiliated in organizations that attained
some permanency in the larger cities; and in the smaller towns organi-
zations also sprang up, some of which were able to raise appreciably
the rate of wages then obtaining. MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra
note 18, at 19.
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their effectiveness was increasingly countered by the action of the judiciary. With
the historical background of English legislation,2" the authority of a random state-
ment in Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown,2 and such dubious precedent as Rex v.
Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge,22 courts found it possible to declare that a
combination to refuse to work for less than a certain wage was a criminal con-
spiracy in restraint of trade.
23
The most famous of the criminal conspiracy cases is, without doubt, the
Philadelphia Cordwainers Case,24 decided in 1806 in the Mayor's Court of Phila-
delphia. A group of cordwainers were charged with agreeing not to labor for less
than certain wages and further agreeing to prevent others, by unlawful means,
from laboring for any rate other than that set by the association. The court, in
convicting the defendants, stated:
... a combination of workmen to raise their wages may be considered from
a twofold point of view; one is to benefit themselves, the other is to injure
those who do not join their society. The rule of law condemns both.
25
In 1842, this application of the conspiracy doctrine was repudiated in Com-
monwealth v. Hunt.26 The Hunt case required a positive showing, either that the
objective of the conspiracy was unlawful, or that the means employed to secure a
lawful objective were unlawful. In the court's opinion, absent specific legislation,
the raising of wages could not be said to be an illegal end, nor combination, as such,
an illegal means.
In the interval between the Philadelphia Cordwainers Case and Common-
wealth v. Hunt, there were a series of indictments and convictions for criminal
conspiracy.27 As late as 1835, the Supreme Court of New York, construing a statute
which in effect restated the common law doctrine of restraint of trade, declared
that combinations to raise or lower wages were criminal offenses.
2 8
The next year a New York attorney, in defense of a group of cordwainers of
the city of Hudson, addressed the following remarks to a jury:
20 In 1799 the first Combinations Act was passed. 39 Geo. III, c. 81. In the following
year this statute was substantially re-enacted, omitting a series of arbitration clauses. 1800,
40 Geo. III, c. 106. In substance these statutes declared illegal and punishable "con-
tracts," "covenants" and "agreements" entered into by any persons for the purpose of
obtaining an "advance of wages," a "lessening or altering" of their hours of work, a de-
creasing of their "quantity of work," or for preventing any person from hiring "whom-
soever they shall think proper." By 1825 this act had been repealed; the Combinations
Act of 1825, substituted in its place, provided for the legality of combinations to raise
wages, improve working conditions, etc. 1825, 6 Geo. IV, c. 129. The scope of the pro-
tection afforded to labor by such legislation was narrowed by the interpretation of the
courts. See, e.g., Rex v. Bykerdike [1832] 1 Moody & Rob. 179, where the court found a
strike to prevent non-union men from continuing in the employ of the colliery an illegiti-
mate concerted activity and not protected by the Combinations Act of 1825.
21 "There can be no doubt but that all conspiracies whatsoever wrongfully to prejudice
a third person are highly criminal at common law." 1 HAwKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
190 (1st ed. 1716). "In the case of labor combinations the most frequent wrongful purpose
for which combinations were formed was restraint of trade." MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, Op.
cit. supra note 18, at 502.
22 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (K.B. 1721). See also R. v. Eccles, 1 Leach C. C. 274,
168 Eng. Rep. 240 (K.B. 1783). These cases were cited by the court to justify a conviction
of laborers in New York in 1810. People v. Melvin, Yates Select Cases 112 (N.Y. 1810);
3 COMMONS AND GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY or AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
251 (1910).
23 Between 1806 and 1815, at least six conspiracy cases were tried before
juries that were judges of both law and fact, four of them resulting in
verdicts adverse to the journeymen; and during the years between the lift-
ing in 1820 of the depression and 1827 still other indictments were returned.
MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 22.
24 3 COMMONS AND GILMORE, op. cit. supra note 22.
25 Id. at 67.
26' 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
27 In criminal cases as contrasted to civil litigation the jury were the judges of both
law and fact. GREGORY & KATZ, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTS 19 (1948).
28 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1835).
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You will observe also that the Court admit the right of the journey-
men to get an advance of wages and their right to refuse to work for less.
The end in view, viz: an advance in wages and the means of obtaining
it, viz: by refusing to work, are both lawful. Yet it is the combination
which is offensive - it is the conspiracy for which they may be indicted.
What is this but saying in plain language that it is a criminal act, - a
conspiracy for men to combine together to attain a lawful end by lawful
means? Can plain men of common sense comprehend it? Why, even Chitty
in his treatise on criminal law.. . says ... that "it is impossible to conceive
a combination as such to be illegal."
29
The illegality, then, which the courts saw in unionism was the combination
which forced an "unnatural" rise in wages. The spirit of individualism was the
prevailing mood of the era, a mood which gave to the individual unabridged free-
dom to pursue his economic interests as he saw fit. This disposition, and the bet-
terment of society that was thought to be attendant on its observance, was not to
be jeopardized by concerted action among working men. Each individual must
fend for himself. To join with others was to break the rules of the game.30
Although Commonwealth v. Hunt categorically disavowed the prevalent theory
that there was a special unlawfulness peculiar to labor organizations, it can hardly
be said that it marked the emancipation of labor." The questions of what means
unions might use to advance their economic interests, and what ends they might
lawfully attempt to achieve, occupied the courts until the close of the 19th century,
even as they do today.
In the 20 years after Commonwealth v. Hunt only three conspiracy prosecu-
tions are known to have occurred in connection with labor disputes.3 2 The crisis of
1837 and the subsequent depression of the economy militated against the newly
formed unions, and many of them lacked the resources necessary to weather the
storm.
For the first time in American history the labor movement, if such can be said
to have existed during this period, was dominated by the so-called intellectuals:
When there is general unemployment and when those who are fortunate
enough to obtain work must accept low wages, the general unrest and
discontent make fertile soil for the reformer, the dreamer, the political and
social theorist, the fanatic. These bad times were no exception. The idealists
were not slow to put in their appearance and soon were in possession of
the social forum. The laborer himself was little heard. He was supposed
to listen. Not infrequently he yielded and joined the band of reformers
and theorists, knowing not whither he was going but glad to be on his
way.
3 3
In the early 1850's, due partly to the discovery of gold in California and
Australia, there was an upsurge of business activity. The laborer returned to the
trade union, but union activity had hardly revived when the panic of 1857 once
again depressed industrial activity.3 4
During the Civil War, government activity stimulated industry. At first, the
rise in prices, accompanied by a decline in real wages, the dislocation of industry,
29 John W. Edmonds, Esq., in defense of a group of cordwainers in the city of Hudson,
1836.
30 The economist was up to the task of supporting this theory. David Ricardo developed
what was known as the "iron law of wages." Wages are of necessity the amount necessary
to enable the worker to subsist and to perpetuate his race without either increase or dim-
inution. To increase wages arbitrarily is to increase population. Thus, concerted activity
to raise wages above subsistence is a self-defeating experiment. CUMMINS & DVyvER, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 12-15.
31 Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 828 (1926).
32 Id. at 829, n. 18.
33 C UMMiNs & D-VYvER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 115-16.
34 Id. at 116-17:
The Typographical Union was organized nationally in 1850. The stone
cutters organized nationally in 1853, the hat finishers in 1854, the loco-
motive engineers in 1855, the iron moulders, the machinists and black-
smiths in 1859.
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and the introduction of machinery placed labor organizations in a helpless position.
By 1863 nearly all those organizations which had survived the depression of 1857
had disappeared.3 5 By the closing years of the war, however, trade unionism was
revived,3 stimulated by an abnormal demand for goods and an increasing shortage
of manpower.
3 7
Between 1863 and 1880 there were at least seven labor conspiracy cases in
Pennsylvania, five in New York, three in New Jersey, and one each in Connecticut,
Illinois, and Missouri.38 Post-war legislative activity was designed to thwart the
advance of labor organization. An Illinois statute of 1863 made it a crime for
"9any person" by threat, intimidation or otherwise, to prevent any other person
from working at a lawful business on whatever terms he saw fit. Also proscribed
was combined activity for the purpose of depriving the property owner of his right
to manage, or preventing any person from being employed on whatever terms the
parties might agree upon.3 9 In 1869 the trend of legislation reversed itself and in
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Maryland and Illinois, statutes were enacted
to nullify the common law conspiracy doctrine.40 For the most part these laws re-
quired a showing that either the ends sought or the means used were illegal. Their
effectiveness, however, is doubtful, 41 primarily because of their broad terminology.
In 1867, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a lower court's refusal to
quash an indictment which charged, in substance, that the. defendants combined
to compel their employer to discharge certain of their fellow workmen by simul-
taneously quitting in a body.4 2 Harking back to the days prior to Commonwealth
v. Hunt, the judge declared:
I conclude, then, . . . that cases may occur in which the purpose designed
to be fulfilled becomes punitive as a public offense solely from the fact
of the existence of a confederacy to effect such purpose.
43
Hunt was endorsed both in principle and result,"* but distinguished, since in the
New Jersey case the defendants combined to compel their employer to discharge
fellow workers by an announced determination to quit their employment in a
body.45 This was an unlawful objective.
The Supreme Court of New York decided in the same year Master Stevedores'
Association v. Walsh.40 Suit was brought by the association to enforce a penalty
against Walsh, who had undertaken to charge less than the amount stated in the
association's schedule. The penalty was set out in the by-laws of the association of
which Walsh was a voluntary member. The court overruled Walsh's demurrer,
35 MILLIS AND MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 18, at 45.
36 Witte, supra note 31, at 829.
37 MILUS AND MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 18, at 46.
38 Witte, supra note 31, at 829.
39 ILL. L. 1863, 70. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. 1866, § 122, at 264, wherein conspira-
cies to interfere with the operation of railroads, gas, and telegraph companies are declared
illegal and punishable.
40 PA. L., Act 1242, 1869; PA. L., Act 1105, 1872; PA. L., Act 33, 1876; PA. L., Act
230, 1891; N.Y.L. 1870, c. 19; N.Y.L. 1882, c. 384; N.Y. PENAL CODE, 1881, § 170; N.J.
ACTS 1883, c. 28; MARYLAND L., 1884, c. 266; ILL. L. 1873, 76.
41 Witte, supra note 31, at 830.
42 State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1867).
43 Id. at 153-4, 90 Am. Dec. at 651. In support of this conclusion the court cites such
cases as Rex v. Lord Grey, 3 Hargrave; State Trials 519; Rex. v. Francis Deleval, 3 Burr.
1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763). These cases involved a conspiracy to induce a young
female to leave the house of her parents in order to facilitate her prostitution. Also cited
were Rex v. Armstrong, 1 Vent. 304, 86 Eng. Rep. 196 (K.B. 1688); Rex v. Kimberty,
I Lev. 62, 83 Eng. Rep. 297 (K.B. 1674); Rex v. Timberly, 1 Sid. 68, 82 Eng. Rep. 974
(K.B. 1670). These cases involved combinations to charge a man with being the father
of a bastard, The court pointed out that in law these actions if done by an individual
would not constitute a criminal offense, the combination being alone the quality of the
transaction which made them indictable. Id. at 153, 90 Am. Dec. at 650.
44 Id. at 157, 90 Am. Dec. at 654.
45 Ibid.
46 2 Daly 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867).
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holding that the object of such an association was not in restraint of trade and that
the doctrine of criminal conspiracy to raise wages was not a part of the common
law. The court seemed to suggest that the scope of concerted activity was limited
to refusals to work for less than a determined wage. Any other reason for a strike
was apparently suspect.
It may, therefore, be laid down ... that it is lawful for any number of
journeymen or of master workmen to agree, on the one part that they will
not labor below certain rates or on the other hand that they will not pay
above certain prices; but that any association or combination for the pur-
pose of compelling journeymen or employers to conform to any rule, regula-
tion, or agreement fixing the rate of wages, to which they are not parties,
by the imposition of penalties, by agreeing to quit the service of any em-
ployer who employs a journeyman below certain rates, unless the journey-
man pays the penalty imposed by the combination, or by menaces, threats,
or intimidations, violence or other unlawful means, is a conspiracy for
which the parties entering into it may be indicted.
47
Arguably, the Walsh case represents no advance in the clarity of the law of
conspiracy.48 It is likely, in view of the bias represented by the concluding remarks
in the opinion, that labor was in no better position in New York than it was under
the Donaldson decision in New Jersey.
In any event the doctrine of the Donaldson case was followed in a series of
labor cases throughout the early 1870's.4 9 After 1875 the number of conspiracy
prosecutions diminished, although more such cases were reported in the 1880's,
particularly from 1885 to 1887, when there was great public alarm over the in-
creasing number of strikes and boycotts.', By the turn of the century, however,
this legal weapon was used rarely, partly because of the increasing reluctance of the
courts to find union activity illegal,52 but primarily because of the increasing use
of the injunction as a standard form of action in legal controversies growing out
of labor disputes.
3. The Labor Injunction
The use of the labor injunction can be traced to the late 187 0's and a national
wave of railway strikes. The railroads, by reason of their methods of financing,
were by this time reduced to a position of insolvency." Most of them were in re-
ceivership and those entrusted with their management were, of course, officers of
the court.
Because of the insolvency of the industry wages were low. The answer of the
laborer was to strike. Whatever might have been the contemporary judicial opinion
of strikes against private railroad management, strikes against receivers were re-
garded as interferences with the administration of the courts; they were punished
as contempts of court.54 Although these cases did not involve disobedience to injunc-
47 Id. at 7.
48 Contra, see Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes, II, 40 COLUm. L. Rlv.
14, 47 (1947).
49 LANDIS AND MANOFF, CASES ON LABOa LAw 37, n. 15 (2d ed. 1942).
50 Id. at 38.
51 Commonwealth ex rel. Valletti v. Sheriff, 15 Phil. Rep. 393, (Ct. Quar. Sess. 1881);
State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 At. 559 (1887); State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 47, 8 Ad.
890 (1887); Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888).
52 See, e.g., State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769 (1901), where the court
held that a conspiracy, the purposes of which were to compel truckmen to employ only
union drivers and to pay certain wages, was not illegal. Nor was picketing an unlawful
means to achieve these ends. The crucial question was whether there was force or violence
and this was properly left to the jury.
53 Nellis, A Strike and Its Legal Consequences - An Examination of the Receivership
Precedent for Labor Injunctions, 40 YALE L.J. 507 (1931).
54 See King v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co., 14 Fed. Cas. 539 (No. 7800) (C.C.D. Ind. 1877);
Secor v. Toledo, P & W R.R., 21 Fed. Cas. 968 (No. 12605) (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1877).
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tions, they involved disobedience to court orders directing receivers to operate
trains,"5 and thus they were summary proceedings.
The first reported cases of injunctions being issued in labor disputes are Sherry
v. Perkins" and United States v. Debs.57 In both, the justification for the use of
the injunction was imminent peril to property. The right to do business was equated
with a property right; it, too, was protected by an injunctive remedy.58 The action
of the Supreme Court in the Debs case was the ultimate approval of the injunction
in labor disputes.5 9
Prior to 1931 at least 508 injunctions were issued in the federal courts and
1,364 in state courts.60 The scope of these injunctions was generally broad.61 In
one case striking miners, who were apparently residing in a company town and
refusing to quit their homes, were ordered to refrain
. . . from disbursing any funds for any further appeal bonds, attorney
services .... for the purpose of enabling, aiding (or) encouraging ... any
person to occupy against the plaintiff's will any . . . mining houses of the
plaintiff.
2
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act,63 which declared combinations
in restraint of trade among the several states to be illegal. Whether Congress in-
tended it to apply to labor organizations as well as to industrial combinations is
a question that has provoked much debate. In any event, it was upon this statute
that the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois rested its decision in the
Debs case.64 In affirming the issuance of the injunction the Supreme Court declined
to base its decision on the Act,65 and chose instead a statute which protected the
government's interest in the mails."6 The lower federal courts, however, continued
to make use of the Sherman Act as the foundation for their jurisdiction over labor
disputes,67 a practice finally sanctioned by the Supreme Court in 1908 in the Dan-
bury Hatters case.6 s
In national elections from 1908 to 1912, unions waged an aggressive campaign
to amend the Sherman Act. In 1914 these efforts culminated in the passage of the
Clayton Act.69 The first paragraph of Section 20 provided that no injunction
should issue in any dispute between an employer and employees involving the terms
or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
property. When passed, this legislation was hailed as the redemption of labor.
55 Nellis, supra note 53, at 524.
56 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888). Injunction was issued to restrain picketing.
57 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd, In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). On ap-
peal to the Supreme Court from the conviction for contempt of the injunction the court
stated "that the jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction is . . .
recognized from ancient times and by indubitable authority." Id. at 599. For a criticism
of the "indubitable authority" on which the court relied, see FRANKFURTER AND GREENg,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION 20-3 (1930).
58 Witte, supra note 31, at 833-34.
59 Early cases involving the use of injunctions are Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. 40 (C.C.
E.D. La. 1893); Coeur d'Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v. Miners Union, 51 Fed. 260
(C.C.D. Idaho 1892); Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 135 (C.C.
S.D. Ohio 1891); Barr. v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881 (1894);
Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595, 25 Atl. 492 (1893); Brace Bros. v. Evans, 5 Pa. Co. Ct.
163 (1888).
60 WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 84 (1932).
61 See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 86-122. See also Newton
Co. v. Erickson, 70 Misc. 291, 298, 126 N.Y. Supp. 949 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
62 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 101, n. 91.
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64 United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894).
65 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
66 U.S. Criminal Code § 201, 35 Stat. 1127 (1909).
67 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 9, n. 39.
68 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
69 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27, 44 (1958); 29
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Seven years elapsed between the time of its passage and its first interpretation
by the Supreme Court. Between 1916 and 1920, in 13 reported cases applying
Section 20, only three courts held that the act prevented the issuing of an injunc-
tion. 0 With this judicial background the Supreme Court in 1921 decided Duplex
v. Deering.
71
In Duplex, an injunction was issued against members of the International
Association of Machinists in New York City who were attempting to carry on a
secondary boycott of the plaintiff's distributors and retailers. Claiming the privilege
of the Clayton Act, the Machinists were taken before the Supreme Court by the
Duplex Company, who appealed from adverse judgments in both district 2 and
circuit7 3 courts. The Supreme Court reversed; irreparable injury to one's business
is irreparable injury to property, the Court said; insofar as the first paragraph of
Section 20 had reference to employees, it did not comprehend the New York
machinists, who were in no substantial way connected with the Duplex Company.
Furthermore, the specific activity condoned by the second paragraph of Section 20
- the persuading of a person to stop work or patronizing - must be "peaceful
and lawful," which a secondary boycott is not, the Court stated.
Before Duplex, a number of states7 4 had enacted legislation similar to the
Clayton Act. Most states, through a narrow construction of these statutes, reached
the same result as the Court in Duplex.75 When the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that such an enactment prohibited the issuing of an injunction to restrain
continuous picketing and general rowdiness, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed, declaring that such activity was a deprivation of the plaintiff's
property without due process of law and a denial of equal protection; picketing by
anyone other than striking employees, the Court said, was both tortious and en-
joinable.
7 6
The strike as such had by the turn of the century received legal sanction.
7 7
Other means of effectuating union demands did not fare so well. The courts, for
instance, took a dim view of picketing; the statement of Judge McPherson in
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee is illustrative: 78
There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than
there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching.
When men want to converse or persuade, they do not organize a picket line.
Nonetheless another federal court, dealing with a faciually similar case, was re-
luctant to enjoin picketing. It recognized it as a legitimate weapon of the union
and trusted that the "officers ... among the men who have gone on strike ...
70 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 165.
71 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
72 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 Fed. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
73 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 Fed. 722 (C.C.A. 2d 1918).
74 Asuz. REv. CoDE ANN. § 4286 (1928) (enacted 1913); ILL. REv. STAT. C. 22, § 58
(1933) (enacted 1925); KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1104, 1107 (1923) (enacted 1907);
MXNN. STAT. §§ 4256, 4257 (1927) (enacted 1917); N.J. CoUP. STAT. 9, § 107-131a (1925);
N.D. CoUP. LAws ANN. §§ 7214al, 7214a2 (1925) (enacted 1919); ORE. CODE ANN.
§ 49-902, 903 (1930) (enacted 1919); UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-2-6, 49-2-7 (1933)
(enacted 1917); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7612 (1932) (enacted 1919).
75 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 181, n. 184.
76 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
77 [T]here is no question of the general right of a labor union to strike
. . . [w]hen and for what end this power of coercion and compulsion
... may be .. .used is the question . . .this case calls upon us to de-
cide. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 757 (1906).
78 139 Fed. 582, 584 (S.D. Ia. 1905). Thirty-five years later the Supreme Court, in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), equated peaceful picketing with free speech,
thus rendering state restrictions on its exercise subject to 14th Amendment objection. How-
ever, by 1957 the Court retreated from this simple equation and held that a valid public
policy - prohibition of acts seeking to compel an employer to make his employees join
a union - would support a ban on such picketing. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957). The law today is apparently where it was in the pre-1940's.
See Senn v. The Tile Layer's Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
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will understand the views of the court as to their rights and duties .... " 79 The
Supreme Court of the United States, while not condemning picketing, nevertheless
spoke of it as "sinister" and was not able to ignore "the necessary element of intimi-
dation in the presence of groups as pickets."8' 0
The existence of peaceful picketing was also considered by some of the state
courts.8' The Supreme Court of Indiana, for instance, said:
The law, having granted workmen the right to strike to secure better
conditions from their employers, grants them also the use of those means
and agencies, not inconsistent with the rights of others, that are necessary
to make the strike effective.8 2
The secondary boycott was authoritatively condemned as an illegal means to
gain valid economic benefits. 8 3 To attempt to
... influence A by exerting some sort of economic or social pressure against
persons who deal with A - has been condemned by the Federal and Mas-
sachusetts courts in a series of instances revealing a great range of versatility.
Whether the means of pressure upon a third person be a threat of strike
against him, a refusal to work on material of non-union manufacture, an
unfair list backed by the show of concerted action . . . , coercion and
intimidation measures generally, or merely notice by circularization, ban-
ners or publication - the ban of illegality has fallen upon all alike.84
Outside of the Massachusetts and federal courts, opinions were divided on the
lawfulness of secondary boycotts. While Illinois85 and Minnesota 6 condemned the
activity, California 87 and New York 8 saw no illegality involved in it.
No less did the courts question the object of a strike than they did the means
used. When the object was shorter hours, or better wages and working conditions,
there was little difficulty. But if the immediate object was to secure a union shop,
then the courts once more were thrown into dissension. While some courts were
quite sure that strikes to compel the discharge of non-union men were illegal per
se,89 others were certain that such activity was directly connected with the best
interests of the union members and thus any resulting injury was to be tolerated. 0
In seeking a union shop a large part of the difficulty unions encountered was
the increasing use of the "yellow dog" contract, requiring the laborer to sign an
agreement not to become a member of any labor organization. Concerted activity to
force the laborer to join a union despite his agreement with the employer constituted
intentional interference with contractual relations and as such was properly enjoin-
79 Pope Motor Car Co. v. Kugon, 150 Fed. 148, 152 (C.C.N.D. -Ohio 1906).
80 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Control Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 207
(1921).
81 Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188, 197, 53 S.E.
273 (1906); Root v. Anderson, 207 S.W. 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918); Cumberland Glass Mfg.
Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 59 N.J. Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 208 (1899); Foster v. Retail
Clerks Protective Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Greenfield v. Central Labor
Council (Ore. 1920); Steffes v. Motion Picture Union, 136 Minn. 200, 161 N.W. 524
(1917); but see Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336, 340, 62 S.E.
236 (1908).
82 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworks' Local Union, 165 Ind. 421, 430,
75 N.E. 877, 880 (1905).
83 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
84 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 43.
85 Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N.E. 928 (1908).
86 Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663 (1903).
87 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909).
88 Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917).
89 Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 At. 224 (1914); Ruddy v. Plumbers, 79 N.J.L.
467, 75 Ad. 742 (1910); State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814 (1895); Lucke v. Clothing
Cutters, 77 Md. 396, 26 Ad. 505 (1893).
90 Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 At. 659 (1917);
Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 520
(1917); Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N.E. 389 (1912); Kissam v. United
States Printing Co., 199 N.Y. 76, 92 N.E. 214 (1910); Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather,
53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
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able.' In the leading case of Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 2 the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the use of an injunction to restrain union organiz-
ers from soliciting membership among non-union men who had entered into such
contracts. 3 While many courts displayed the same general readiness to support the
non-union agreement, 94 the New York Court of Appeals disclosed an independent
attitude and allowed solicitation of non-union men even though they were members
of a "company union" and had agreed not to become associated with any outside
labor organization."
The usefulness to the employer of the "yellow dog" contract is hardly to be
doubted. Prior to 1921 and the Hitchman case numerous states had attempted to
declare criminal the making of such contracts.9 6 These laws were held unconstitu-
tional, usually by state courts ;97 in Kansas such a law was upheld,99 but the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed.9 9 Such legislation was held to be violative of
the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. 09 Comparable federal legislation
was invalidated in Adair v. United States.'0 '
The next approach taken by legislatures was declaring such contracts void
and unenforceable both in law and equity.'0 2 These laws were enacted during the
early 1930's and "due to the fundamental changes in the prevailing points of view
about these matters, the older constitutional objections against this type of legislation
seem to have gone by default."'
03
In the Great Depression measures to equalize bargaining power came to be
more widely favored. In 1932 a Republican Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia
Anti-injunction Act,'0 4 which effectively curbed the use of injunctions as a device
to thwart the activities of labor unions. 09 Differing from its precursor, the Clayton
Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly defined "labor dispute" and set out in
detail specific types of union activity which were not to be the grounds for the
issuing of an injunction. The bill, supposedly drafted by Professor Frankfurter, was
immediately copied by a dozen or more state legislatures.'0 0 It marked the climax
in a period which saw the labor movement slowly freed from legal restrictions.
B. The Period of Consolidation
1. The Wagner Act
On July 5, 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, 07 known
for its sponsor as the Wagner Act. This act represented a positive national com-
mitment to the policy of collective bargaining in all major industries. 0 8 It af-
91 Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assoc., 77 N.J. Eq. 219, 233, 79 Ad. 262
(1911).
92 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
93 An additional element of the case was the attempt by the union organizer to keep
secret their proselytizing until the majority of the men had indicated a willingness to join.
This seemed particularly to disturb the court. Id. at 246, 47, 54-57.
94 McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 226 (1921); Floersheimer
v. Schlesinger, 115 Misc. 9, 187 N.Y. Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
95 Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863 (1928).
96 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 146, n. 52.
97 See, e.g., People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 1073 (1906).
98 State v. Coppage, 87 Kan. 752, 125 Pac. 8 (1912).
99 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
100 Id. at 11.
101 208 U.S. 161 (1908), which held unconstitutional a provision of the Erdman Act,
30 Stat. 424, c. 370 (1898).
102 5 FORD. L. REv. 125, 140, n. 88 (1936).
103 Gregory and Katz, op. cit. supra note 27, at 141.
104 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
105 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Company, 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Senn v.
Tile Layers' Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
106 Gregory, op. cit. supra note 12, at 185.
107 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
108 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-166. (1958).
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forded unions protection in their organizational activities, 0 9 penalized certain unfair
labor practices on the part of employers,"10 and established a federal agency to
administer its provisions.:'
The shift of attitudes in favor of the labor movement represented in this legisla-
tion did not occur overnight. President Wilson in 1917 had established a Media-
tion Commission to try to settle some of the labor problems arising out of the war
effort. Its report in 1918 recommended the establishment of a national labor
policy based on: (1) the principles of collective bargaining, (2) an administrative
agency to adjust labor disputes, and (3) a central agency to provide a unified
labor-relations policy.:" 2
In April of 1918, the National War Labor Board was established along these
lines. 3  Although compliance with its decisions was not mandatory, the Board
was able to put a good deal of its program into effect, perhaps on account of the
patriotic fervor prevalent at the time. At the close of the war the Board disbanded
and a surge of interest in economic expansion quickly put the interests of employees
and employers in opposition. The voluntary recognition of mutual rights and the
willingness to cooperate soon disappeared."14
Another forerunner of the Wagner Act was the Railway Labor Act of 1926,"
5
passed at the end of a series of unsuccessful attempts on the part of Congress to
deal with labor problems in the field of transportation." 6 The act permitted workers
to choose bargaining agents free from outside influence" 7 and imposed on both
railroads and labor organizations the duty to make reasonable efforts to arrive at
agreements concerning wages, hours and working conditions."" In cases where
industry and labor failed to reach agreement,"19 a Board of Mediation was given
the duty to mediate and to attempt to persuade the-parties to arbitrate if mediation
failed. 2 0 Arbitration, however, was voluntary and could be rejected. 2' If the
breakdown of negotiations threatened an emergency the Board was authorized
to investigate and report to the President.' 22 The Board as established by the Rail-
way Labor Act was to have significant effect upon the later development of the
National Labor Relations Board.
23
The constitutionality of the act was attacked in Texas & New Orleans Rd.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks."14 It was upheld, since "freedom of choice in
the selection of representatives on each side of the dispute [was] the essential foun-
dation of the statutory scheme."" 25 Here, incidentally, the Supreme Court gave
a quiet burial to the Adair and Coppage cases."
2 6
109 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
110 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
111 49 Stat. 451-455 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 153, 159-161 (1958).
112 See MoNAUGHTON & LAZAR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT 140
(1954).
113 For a full discussion of the creation and functioning of the War Labor Board .see Gregg,
The National War Labor Board, 33 HARV. L. REV. 39 (1919).
114 Ibid.
115 44 Stat. 597 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1958). The act was finally
passed as a result of negotiations between employee representatives and the carriers. Agree-
ment was reached upon a bill which would be acceptable to both parties. It was introduced
into Congress, and after hearing and debate, it was enacted without amendment. Mc-
NAUGHTON & LAZAR, op. cit. supra note 112, at 107-09.
116 Id. at 95-107.
117 44 Stat. 578 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
118 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958.
119 44 Stat. 580 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1958).
120 44 Stat. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
121 Ibid.
122 44 Stat. 586 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1958).
123 The Railway Labor Act and the activities of the Board of Mediation are discussed in
MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 737-48 (1st ed. 1945).
124 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
125 Id. at 569.
126 See cases cited notes 99, 101 supra.
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The first federal legislation to attempt to extend the principle of free collective
bargaining to all industries was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.27
Section 7 (a) of the act provided that:
employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designa-
tion of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.' 28
The passage of the N.I.R.A. was a stimulus to trade-union activity,129 al-
though many workers were shunted into company unions by employers seeking to
preserve their power positions. 30 The increase in union strength also was not with-
out opposition. Strikes continued to occur,' 31 and the act proved inadequate in the
case of these disputes.
In 1934 a Board created by the President pursuant to a joint resolution of
Congress became active in the administration of these provisions. 32 Less than a
year later, however, the entire program was invalidated by the Supreme Court in
the famous Schechter case, 33 and the labor provisions fell with the rest. 8 4 At
this point, the evolutionary process which produced the Wagner Act was at an end.
The Act was the proposed solution to socio-economic problems which were becom-
ing more apparent over the course of years; it was a combination of previous limited
actions. Still in its comprehensiveness it went far beyond anything which had
been done in the past. Section 7135 carried over the provisions of Section 7(a)
of the NIRA and insured the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
through freely chosen representatives, and to engage in concerted action for that
purpose or for other mutual did or protection. To guarantee the rights of em-
ployees, Section 8136 prohibited acts by employers which were inconsistent with the
rights recognized by Section 7. The Act established a National Labor Relations
Board13 7 which, for the first time, had power to enforce its decisions. No longer
was the employee merely free to try to organize and bargain collectively. Under
the Wagner Act the employer was compelled to remain inactive and to permit
unionization;""8 "company unions" were disestablished.
The remarks of Senator Wagner might indicate that labor was to be the chief
benefactor of this legislation. "And today, with economic problems occupying the
center of the stage, we strive to liberate the common man from destitution, from
insecurity and from human exploitation."' 3 9 In a large sense this was true, but the
Act was more than a "pro-labor" law. It came in the midst of the nation's worst
depression. In 1933, 25 per cent of the civilian labor force, almost 13 million persons,
127 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
128 Id. at 48 Stat. 198 (1933).
129 On October 1, 1933, William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor,
announced that his membership had increased 1,300,000 since the enactment of the National
Industrial Recovery Act. New York Times, October 2, 1933, p. 1.
130 McNatt, Organized Labor and the Recovery Act, 32 MICH. L. REv. 780, 795-800
(1933); Note, 37 COLum. L. REv. 816, 827 (1937); Note, 35 COLUM. L. Rav. 1098, 1102,
n. 36 (1935); Note, 34 COLUM. L. Rav. 1529, 1537, n. 44 (1934).
131 MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 22 (1950).
132 McNAUGHTON & LAZAR, op. cit. supra note 112, at 143.
133 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134 For a general account of the constitutional litigation of this period see generally,
Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HAv. L. Rlv.
645 (1946).
135 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
136 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
137 49 Stat. 451 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1958).
138 See S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); Note, 37 COLuMi. L. REv. 816
(1937); BUiFORD, THE WAGNER ACT, §§ 74-98 (1941).
139 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
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were unemployed . 40 Unemployment stood at nearly 11 million in 1935.14' The
gross national product had slumped from a 1929 high of $104.4 billion to $56 bil-
lion in 1933.142 No one, neither labor nor management, could prosper under those
conditions. Senator Wagner, in urging the Senate to pass the bill, traced the eco-
nomic maladies of the day to unequal treatment of the laboring force. 43 The
same view was expressed in the statement of findings and policy, Section 1 of the
Act.144 Collective bargaining was offered as a vehicle for producing general pros-
perity; it was expected to raise the position of the worker without seriously limiting
the freedom of the parties.
In the face of a crescendo of constitutional objections, 145 the Supreme Court,
in the Jones & Laughlin case,' 46 upheld the Wagner Act on principles by then
fairly familiar. The Court refused to "shut our eyes to the plainest fact of our na-
tional life and deal with the question . . . in an intellectual vacuum.' 47
The framers of the Wagner Act did not expect to see the employers' tradi-
tional power of unfettered unilateral decision eliminated overnight. Collective
bargaining obviously could not take place without recognized bargaining units.
It was the intention of Congress that such units be formed and be sufficiently strong
to make meaningful the collective bargaining process. Past experience had shown
that union growth and acceptance did not follow from the mere expression of the
congressional will. Employees were fearful of losing their jobs; employers, anxious
to conserve their economic power position, were willing to fight the labor organiza-
tions at every turn. This explains the almost one-sided provisions of the NLRA -
the adoption of employer unfair labor practices, the explicit protection of the right
to strike, and the later court protection of boycotts and picketing. These things
were tools, necessitated by the times, to overcome the opposition to unified employee
action and to produce, quickly, the strong unions necessary to give importance to
collective bargaining.
48
The prediction that protection of the right to organize would induce collective
bargaining proved to be correct. The unions gained in size and strength and the
collective bargaining process won wide- if sometimes reluctant- acceptance.
Under the original NLRA, union membership increased from four million in
1935 to about 15 million by 1947.149
The Wagner Act was not a panacea; it was subjected to constant and caustic
criticism. The employer could not file representation petitions unless faced with con-
flicting claims; there were no provisions made for decertification. Split loyalty was
fostered when supervisors were permitted to organize, a practice upheld in Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB.150 Legitimate independent unions were discriminated
against by the Board. Too much deference, said some critics, was paid to the "expert-
140 OFricE OF BusINEss Ecoxomics, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMm., Business Statistics 59 (1959
ed.).
141 Ibid.
142 Id. at 2.
143 79 CONG. REc. 7565-74 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
144 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
145 Before the new Board even had a chance to promulgate its procedure, a National
Lawyers Committee of the American League printed an assault on its constitutionality.
The process was like a rolling snowball. The allegations in a pleading filed
by an employer in Georgia, for example, would show up in precisely the
same wording in a pleading in Seattle. NATIONAL LABOR RFLATIONS BOARD,
First Annual Report, p. 46.
146 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
147 Id. at 41.
148 "'The prime requisite and first step to collective bargaining is, therefore, union recog-
nition."' National Labor Relations Board v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713, 715
(1939), quoting National Labor Relations Board, Reply Brief, page 9.
149 McNAUGHTON & LAZAR, op. cit. supra note 112, at 154.
150 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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ise" of the Board.151 Others objected to the authorization of the closed shop.1 52 It
was only a matter of time before these criticisms could be expected to ripen into
concrete proposals to amend the Wagner Act.
The public interest in full production superseded all other considerations dur-
ing the years of World War II. The unions accepted their responsibilities towards
the national defense effort; they entered and adhered to voluntary no-strike con-
tracts.'53 But the period following the war produced a rash of strikes and exercises
of union power, 4 the production delays coming when the usual post-war desire
for consumer goods was at its peak. There was strong public feeling against a
movement which hampered a rapid transition to a peacetime economy; conditions
were ripe for the enactment of labor legislation which would re-adjust the legal
situation in the labor management field.
2. The Taft-Hartley Act and "Right-to-Work" Laws
Just as the Wagner Act cannot be fairly characterized as purely "pro-labor,"
the Labor Management Relations Ac of 1947,1 S called the Taft-Hartley Act after
its co-sponsors, cannot be fairly termed "anti-union." The original bill was passed
to correct a perilous situation. It swung the pendulum of the law towards more
powerful unions. By 1947 the factual situation had shifted appreciably. Unions
which had been broken in the postwar strikes of 1919-20 were now able to survive.
Membership in unions had increased by 11 million.5 8 The most important objec-
tive of the Wagner Act had been largely accomplished: collective bargaining as a
means of settling labor disputes had become a reality.
If it is difficult fully to assess those factors which finally led to the enactment
of Taft-Hartley over President Truman's veto, there is little question that,
the authors of the Taft-Hartley Act proceeded on the premise that labor
unions had become too powerful and that it was therefore necessary to bring
about a new balance of power in the collective-bargaining process ...
Government was no longer to throw its full weight to the side of the union
in industrial conflicts; instead, the balance of power ... was to be equalized,
and the government was to side with neither party but rather to safeguard
the public welfare. 157
Perhaps the key factor which finally made possible its passage was John L. Lewis'
mine strike of 1946.'5s Some bituminous mines had been seized by the government.
When the Interior Department refused to reopen contract negotiations, the miners
struck. The strike eventually resulted in contempt proceedings and fines of $700,000
against the union and $10,000 against Lewis. The dispute finally terminated before
the Supreme Court in United States v. United Mine Workers; 5 9 the fines were
upheld.
151 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) was a case in point. There the
Supreme 'Court paid deference to the "expertise" of the Board and followed their determina-
tion that some newsboys were "employees" within the meaning of the act. They were not
independent contractors.
152 See S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1935), and BuFFoRD, THE WAGNER
ACT, §§ 192-96 (1941).
153 There were, of course, numerous instances of work stoppage during the war. For a
textual and statistical analysis of labor conditions during and immediately following the
war, see MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 271-362 (1950).
154 There were about 38 million man-hours lost through strikes in 1945; 116 million lost
in 1946 and 34 million lost in 1947. This is in contrast to the war years, 1942 through 1944,
during which a total of oaly 26.5 million man-hours were lost as a result of strikes. Sig-
nificant were the lengths of the strikes. There were nearly as many strikes in 1944 as in
1946 or 1947. Yet strikes during the war were settled quickly (average length in 1944,
5.6 days); strikes during the post-war years were dragged out (average length in 1946, 24.2
days, in 1947, 25.6 days). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 236, at 237 (1958).
155 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1958)
156 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 154, at 236.
157 McNAUGHTON & LAZAR, Op. cit. supra note 112, at 154.
158 Id. at 93, 157.
159 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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- The Taft-Hartley Act 'corrected many of the abuses of the Wagner Act. The
union shop was substituted for the closed- shop,6 0 supervisors were excluded from
the definition of employee;' 6 ' employers were permitted to file representation peti-
tions; 6 2 employees were guaranteed the right not to organize; 63 unionization itself
was not to be fostered contrary to a majority's wishes; a number of. activities on the
part of unions were denounced as unfair labor practices.6 4
But the Taft-Hartley Act by no means represented an abandonment of the
commitment to collective bargaining. For example,, one of the new .union unfair
labor practices was a refusal to bargain in good faith.'65 Senator Taft himself "felt
that if bargaining power could be equalized, many of the industrial-relations prob-
lems . .. would tend to disappear through.the action of collective bargaining."'
66
An important positive feature of the Act was the creation of the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service. 67 The Act also embodied national emergency strike
provisions, which, it was hoped, would avert situations like the mine strike of
1946.16 , Section 14(b), enacted without much discussion, has proved one of the
most controversial provisions. The Act prohibits the closed shop, but'permits the
union shop. Section 14(b), in substance, permits states to enact legislation which
prohibits both forms of union security. Federal law no longer was to pre-empt this
phase of union activity,
6 9 and the "right-to-work" issue was born.
7 6
Today, 18 states have taken advantage of Section 14(b). Some take the form
of constitutional amendments,17 ' others are only legislative enactments. 72 Most
prohibit any form of union security contract.n Three states have repealed "right-
to-work" laws,' 7 4 and one has limited the application of its provisions. 7 5
Discussion of the "right-to-work" issue is seldom unemotional. Proponents
usually argue that such laws protect the freedom of the individual. 7 6 Opponents
generally consider them purely an anti-union measure 7 The tendencies to enact
such legislation seem to have run their course.
7 8
3. The Reform Acts of 1958-59
The Wagner Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act still remains the basic
charter of the national labor policy. One further aspect of the labor movement-
160 LMRA, § 7 when read with § 8(a) (3) had this effect.
161 LMRA, § 2(3).
162 LMRA, § 9 (c)( 1) (B).
163 LMRA, § 7.
164 LMRA, §§ 8(b)(1)-(6).
165 LMRA, § 8(b)(3) and § 8(d).
166 McNAUoHTON & LAZAR, op. cit. supra note 112, at 154.
167 LMRA, §§ 202-04.
168 LMRA, §§ 206-10.
169 H. Cos. REPoRT 510, 80th Cong., p. 60.
170 The acts were quickly challenged on constitutional grounds but were upheld in Lincoln
Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), and its com-
panion cases. For an excellent discussion of the union securities issue, see Skinner, Legal
and Historical Background of the Right to Work Dispute, 9 LAB. L.J. 411 (1958).
171 Arizona, Arkansas,. Florida, Nebraska, South Dakota.
172 Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Utah.
173 Virginia is typical. It provides, in part:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of Virginia that the right
of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of mem-
bership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization.
VA. CODE ANN. § 40-68 (1950).
Four other states also have legislation restricting but not totally prohibiting union security
agreements: Colorado, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Louisiana.
174 Delaware, New Hampshire and Maine.
175 Louisiana.
176 Powell, The Right-to-Work Laws, FED. B.J. 1955 January-March at 68.
177 Woll, State Anti-Union Security Laws - A Tragic Fraud, Id. at 68.
178 See Brown, Right to Work Progress and Prospects in 1958, 9 LAB. L.J. 583 (1958).
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the relation between the union member and his union- merits discussion.Y7
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, a campaign developed
to repeal or amend the new act. "Actually, it was not one campaign but many, and
the participants had widely differing motives and objectives."18s0 It can in general
be said that labor favored repeal rather than modification, while employers gen-
erally sought more restrictions on unions. 81
Not until after the revelations of the McClellan Committee, however, did
sufficient pressure build up to support a successful drive to enact new labor legis-
lation.18 2 The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958183 was the first of
the two new labor bills. Its purpose was-to protect, through disclosure and reporting,
the rights of pension plan participants and beneficiaries.8 4 The second of these
two measures was the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.8'
Its purpose was twofold:
First, it sought, through the enactment of a comprehensive "Bill of Rights"
for union members, to secure the realization of union democracy.8 e6 Equal rights
and freedom of speech and assembly, limitation on the executor of fees and assess-
ments and the collection of dues, protection of the right of access to civil courts, or
to sue or testify and safeguards against improper disciplinary action are now all
guaranteed to union members. Various reports concerning union activity, 8 7 certain
bonding requirements and limitations on union trusteeships 98 and union elec-
tions' 90 are also provided for.' 9'
Second, the act sought to change the restriction on picketing and secondary
boycotts' 92 found in the Taft-Hartley Act, and to re-adjust conflicts in jurisdiction
between the federal and state courts which had arisen under the federal pre-emption
doctrine. 9
179 For an analysis of state and federal activity in the area of union membership, union
discipline, union financial affairs, and union government just prior to the passage of the
recent reform acts see Note, Civil Liberties Within the Labor Movement, 34 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 384-483 (1959).
180 Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Htv. L.
REv. 851, 852 (1960).
181 Ibid.
182 See generally S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sesi. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 741,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings Be-
fore the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
183 72 Stat. 997, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-09 (Supp. 1958).
184 72 Stat. 997, 29 U.S.C.A. § 301 (Supp. 1958).
185 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 (Supp. 1959).
186 LMRDA, §§ 101-05.
187 LMRDA, §§ 201-10.
188 LMRDA, §§ 501-05.
189 LMRDA, §§ 301-06.
190 LMRDA, §§ 401-04.
191 For a general discussion of these provisions see Aaron supra note 180, at 855-905.
192 LMRDA, §§ 701-07. See Aaron, supra note 180, at 1099-1121,
193 LMRDA, § 701. See Aaron, supra note 180, at 1089-98. Section 701, which ends the
"no-man's land" problem which resulted from a series of Supreme Court cases in recent years,
is perhaps one of the more significant provisions of the new act. Garner v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), held in 1953 that a state court could not enjoin
peaceful picketing, although violative of state public policy, if such activity also constitutes
an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Guss v. The Utah
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), held that a state agency could not exercise juris-
diction even where the NLRB had refused to act. A "no-man's land" was thus created.
Section 701 amends section 14 of Taft-Hartley Act so as to overrule this series of cases.
States may now exercise jurisdiction in labor cases where the NLRB refuses to do so. A
crucial question, however, remains. It is not clear what standards - state or federal - are
to be applied. Professor Aaron supra note 180, at 1098, observes that
the real issue is whether the state courts must apply state law. Those who
take the affirmative in this debate must necessarily elevate hope above
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It is perhaps too early to attempt definitive comment on these acts; but certain
points seem to stand out. Conceding that strong unions are the foundation of an
effective collective bargaining process, the highly organized union, like the highly
organized industry, poses a threat to the freedom of the individual member. In one
view, there is positive value in the adoption of a policy to promote internal union
democracy. In another view, these acts are a return to older values, or, perhaps, a
recognition of change in the character of the labor movement. It is possible to see
in the modern labor union no longer a quest by the individual for a participation
in the fruits of his labor, but the emergence of a new form of business activity,
motivated to the same ends as other forms of business activity.19 ' Certainly some
of the history of the trade union movement may be read as a contest for economic
power.'9 5 Samuel Gompers' famous "more" contained implicitly the foundation for
today's "business unionism. " 96 For those who wish to see a return to older values,
the acts may be viewed as an attempt to impede the further growth of the union
movement; for those who see the modern union as only another form of business
activity, the acts may be viewed as a legitimate limitation on union power. But for
those who still see in the union movement positive value, the acts may be seen, in
their attempt to secure union democracy, as part of a solid tradition of legislation
designed to deal with the problems raised by the industrialization of the manufac-
turing process, and an inevitable chasm between owner and worker.
I1. Government Intervention in Collective Bargaining
Having considered the historical development of the national legal commit-
ment to collective bargaining as the appropriate vehicle for settling industrial con-
flict , it is logical to turn to a consideration, in greater detail, of the machinery of
government intervention in labor-management relations. Government intervention
is largely directed at seeking, first, to promote agreement between parties, and, sec-
ond, to protect the public interest by maintaining production.
A. Methods of Achieving Settlement
1. Good Faith Bargaining
In the United States today, great faith is placed in a system of free collective
bargaining as the best method of resolving industrial conflict,' and the one most
likely to prevent strikes and lockouts. This approach is based on the theory that the
responsibilities of self-government will be carried into the bargaining session, and
that the voluntary "give and take" process will result in an equitable solution to the
conflict. America's basic industrial approach has been and is that it is desirable for
the parties themselves voluntarily to enter into negotiations and there determine the
framework of their future conduct.1 9 This is the general policy of collective bar-
reason; nothing in the language or legislative history of section 701(a)
supports this position. A more likely development Is that state courts
will be permitted to apply state law, federal law, or perhaps a combina-
tion of both.
See also Coid, Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the "No-Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44
MINN. L. Rv. 230-56 (1959), and note, 37 U. DET. L.J. 400-10 (1960).
194 See generally BRADLEY, Tim PuBIC STAKE IN UNION POWER 5 (1959).
195 Id. at 6-13.
196 Business unionism is perhaps best summed up in Dave Beck's famous statement, "I am
a businessman. I sell labor." Id. at 6.
197 Feinsinger, Private Mediation -Its Potential, 7 LAs. L.J. 493-96 (1956).
198 The late Senator Robert Taft remarked:
The committee bill [the Taft-Hartley Act] is predicated upon our belief
that a fair, and equitable labor policy can best be achieved by equalizing
existing laws in a manner which will encourage free collective bargaining.
Government decisions should not be substituted for free agreement. S. RaP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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gaining enunciated in Section 1 of the Taft-Hartley Act,1 9 a policy emulated in
most of the states.200
Although there is no requirement that the parties agree, 10' in keeping with this
spirit of voluntary action, an employer and the union certified as the majority repre-
sentative of a particular bargaining unit are required to bargain in good faith.
20 2
The refusal to do so is an unfair labor practice, subject to the sanctions of the
National Labor Relations Act.2 0 3 A difficult question remains, however: What con-
stitutes a lack of "good faith," and what standards are used to measure it?
The NLRB has listed ten elements indicating bad faith on the part of the
employer, 20 4 but the extent of the application of Section 8(b) (3) to the union has
been somewhat limited.2 0 5 Bargaining has been required on certain subjects, 208 but a
genuine impasse releases the parties from a duty to bargain. 20 7 Generally, in ap-
praising the course of the negotiations, the Board has looked for attitudes which
199 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1952):
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
200 See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAWS § 700.
201 LMRA, § 8(d): " . . . to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation . . . to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to . . .
the negotiation of an agreement . . . but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
202 LMRA §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a). The union is under a similar duty. LMRA §§ 8(b)(3),
9(a).
203 LMRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3).
204 (1) Refusal to respond to a union request for a bargaining conference;
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
(2) Refusal to send representatives to the bargaining conference; Great
Southern Trucking Co., v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1942).
(3) Constant shifting of position on contract terms; Twin City Milk Pro-
ducers Assn., 61 NLRB 69 (1945).
(4) Determination not to enter into a bargaining agreement; NLRB v.
Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713 (3d .Cir. 1939).
(5) Deliberately delaying the progress of negotiations; Na-Mac Product
Corp., 70 NLRB 298 (1946).
(6) Unilaterally granting concessions to employees while negotiations are
pending; Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
(7) Engaging in campaigns to undermine the union; NLRB v. Century
Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1944).
(8) Insisting upon contracting with employees rather than with the
union; American Numbering Machine Co., 10 NLRB, 536 (1938).
(9) Rejection of demands without counter-proposals; Globe Cotton Mills
v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
(10) Refusal to embody the agreement into a written contract; NLRB
v. American Nat'l. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
205 Slowdowns and extensions of rest periods, walkouts, partial strikes for shifts or por-
tions of shifts, refusal to work special hours or overtime, and inducing employees of another
concern not to perform work for the employer were held not to be indications of bad faith
in bargaining. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
206 Section 8(d) requires that the employer and the representative of the employee meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith on "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment." Such has been held to include: (1) group insurance plans, (2) low-
rental company-owned housing, (3) merit pay increases, (4) wage incentive plans, (5) pen-
sion and retirement plans, (6) subcontracting of work, (7) disciplinary matters, (8) sen-
iority, (9) price of meals, (10) holiday and vacation pay, (11) bonuses, (12) profit sharing,
(13)work loads and work standards, (14) union security, (15) shop rules, (16) work sched-
ules, (17) rest periods, (18) down grading of employees, and (19) dues checkoff. Mc-
NAUGHTON & LAZAR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT 455 (1954).
207 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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indicate that the parties are dealing with one another as equals, and that they are
not only willing but anxious to reach agreement.20 8
The standard in determining good faith is necessarily a subjective evaluation
of the intent of the parties, 209 and, since this intent can only be evidenced by out-
ward actions, it is possible for the Board to be deceived. But two principles seem
to emerge: (1) the entire conduct of the parties must be examined, 10 and (2)
they must enter the discussion with fair and open minds, with a sincere purpose to
find a basis for agreement.21'
By requiring good faith bargaining the government is, in effect, requiring that
the parties settle their disputes themselves. The "good faith" provision is as far as
government can go and still leave the decision-making completely up to the parties
involved. In theory, at least, good faith bargaining should substantially narrow the
scope of insoluble industrial conflicts; and, in 'practice, the requirement appears to
have had an influence in encouraging sincere bargaining to the extent of avoiding
an unfair labor practice charge. At best the provision appears to be but a weak
attempt to channel and control the effect of the power conflicts of labor and
management upon the national economy.
2. Mediation and Conciliation
Mediation or conciliation -the words are used interchangeably in the field of




Free collective bargaining aims at the reaching of a voluntary agreement based on
reason and persuasion. There would seem to be little room for a voteless mediator,
but where reason and persuasion are the basic ingredients of the decision, psychologi-
cal factors cannot be ignored,213 and this is the mediator's forte. He diagnoses the
psychology of the situation and makes suggestions at the proper time; he simul-
taneously represents a legitimate public interest and symbolizes the moral responsi-
bility of the parties to the community at large. The power of persuasion which is at
his disposal can be an important weapon.
Mediation practice presently includes both private mediators and state and
federal mediation agencies. When a private mediator is selected, even from a gov-
ernment list of competent persons, there is possibly a tendency to be more relaxed.
Since the mediator and the procedural set-up are selected by the parties involved,
there may be more incentive to be successful in the negotiations because the failure
of the mediator is, in a sense, the failure of his selectors. Private mediation has
generally worked well when the parties have resorted to it.2 14 Private mediation,
however, presupposes a willingness in the parties to resort to it. Often a demand
for mediation comes not from the parties but from public impatience with indus-
trial discord; the public wants peace "and a plague on both your houses.121 5 It is
this type of situation that statutory provisions for mediation and conciliation are
designed to meet.
a) federal
The chief instrument of mediation under the federal system is the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), set up under Section 202 of the
208 Note, 61 HARv. L. Rav. 1224 (1948).
209 See NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941).
210 See NLRB v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1941).
211 Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
212 The mediation process has been further classified by Professor Kerr into tactical and
strategical mediation. Kerr, Industrial Conflict and Its Mediation, 60 Am. J. Soc. 230-45
(1954).
213 For an interesting insight into the psychological role of the Mediator, see Mills, The
Role of Mediation in Collective Bargaining, 23 TENN. L. Rav. 146-58 (1954).
214 Feinsinger, Private Mediation - Its Potential, 7 LAB. L.J. 493-96 (1956).
215 For a discussion of the use of private mediators by Allis-Chalmers, International Har-
vester, and Westinghouse, see Feinsinger, supra note 214, at 493-96.
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Taft-Hartley Act 21 6 It is an independent agency; its main function is the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes. Under FMCS rules, either party to a dispute may
request the agency to make its services available; the service can also offer help
on its own initiative.11 The FMCS is limited; the dispute must threaten a substantial
interruption of interstate commerce; and, when local agencies are available, the
service is expected to allow them to handle the dispute."15 A check against over-
mediation is theoretically provided. The services of the agency are not to be made
available except as a last resort, that is, when the collective bargaining process has
broken down. The burden of settlement is to remain on the parties. The service,
however, must be notified within 30 days of the end of an agreement if any issues
connected with a new agreement have not been settled.219 The purpose of the
agency, in short, is "to facilitate and promote the settlement of labor-management
disputes through collective bargaining by encouraging labor and management to
resolve differences through their own resources.
2 0
Under the Railway Labor Act 221 two other federal boards were set up with
mediation powers, the National Mediation Board and the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board. The latter is more arbitrator than mediator. A distinction is drawn
in the Act between disputes about rights and disputes about interests. The former,
generally speaking, concern the interpretation of existing agreements and are
handled by the NRAB. The latter concern controversies over new contract terms
and are referred to the National Mediation Board.2 2 The FMCS, however, is the
only federal mediation service with general jurisdiction to handle labor disputes.
b) state
While there has been some labor relations mediation on the municipal level,
2
2
most mediation, apart from that done by the FMCS, is on a state level pursuant to
various state mediation statutes. Although they contain many departures, the
various acts set up state agencies or boards which are basically similar to the
FMCS.
Presently 43 states and the District of Columbia have some kind of mediation
facility.22 4 Most of the states have set up permanent agencies. 2 5 A few provide for
ad hoc boards to be set up by the governor or allow the governor to handle the
dispute himself.226 Several states make no specific mediation provisions but provide
that agreements to arbitrate may be enforced.22 7 Some of the more industrialized
states in addition to the agency provide for permanent boards of mediation and
arbitration .2 2 Normally such a board will be tripartite, i.e., it will consist of repre-
sentatives of labor, industry, and the general public.
229
216 LMRA § 202.
217 LMRA § 203(b).
218 Ibid.
219 LMRA § 8(d)(3).
220 22 Fed. Reg. 162 § 1403.2(a) (1957).
221 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. 99 151-88 (1952).
222 BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND TEIR SETTLEMENT 108 (1955).
223 Notable in this area are the cities of New York, Newark, and Toledo. See, e.g., Hard,
"Toledo Proves That No Town Need Have Labor Troubles," 38 Reader's Digest 18, (1941).
224 The states which do not have specific mediation agencies are Delaware, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 4 CC- LAn. L. REP. para.
40, 355 (1959).
225 BRAUN, op. cit. supra note 222, at 117. Braun lists 34 states plus Puerto Rico as
having agency mediation provisions. However, Montana has a mediation agency and in
Kansas the Labor Commissioner handles the mediation. Hence, there are now actually 36
states in which mediation is handled through some agency.
226 See, e.g., N.v. REv. STAT. § 614.010 (1955).
227 See, e.g., Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 1-1048.3 (Supp. 1959).
228 See BRAUN, op. cit. supra note 222, at 120. Braun lists the states of Connecticut, Loui-
siana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Okla-
homa, and Oregon. The District of Columbia has no board of its own, but uses the facilities
of the FMCS.
229 For a typical example of a three-member board, see MONT. Rzv. CODES ANN. § 41-
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The Colorado statute,23 0 patterned after the Canadian Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act,231 is perhaps typical of most. Strikes and lockouts in industries
"affected with a public interest' are prohibited pending an investigation by the
Industrial Commission.23 2 Written notice of an intended change affecting conditions
of employment or with respect to wages or hours must be given to the Commission
30 days prior to such intended change.233 Although the Commission's report is to
contain findings and recommendations, the parties are not bound by them. 23 4 They
carry only the force of public opinion. The basic constitutionality of the act was
upheld in Keyes v. UMW23 5 against arguments of involuntary servitude. The act
also provides that injunctions may be issued to restrain violations of the 30-day
period of grace.
236
Most of the statutes also provide that either some public official -usually a
local mayor- or the parties themselves may notify the governor or mediation board
of the existing or threatened strike.237 Some states limit mediation to industries
where a specified number of workers are employed. 23 But most of the statutes, like
Colorado's, permit the board to intervene anywhere on its own motion, investigate,
fix responsibilities, and make public its findings.239
c) foreign
There has been, perhaps, more activity in the field of mediation abroad than
in this country.240 So that a better understanding of the whole mediation process
and its underlying philosophy can be obtained, there will be considered here the
basic outlines of the various programs followed in several foreign countries, par-
ticularly Great Britain and Canada.
Generally, labor-management representatives play a larger role in the mediation
process than in the United States. This is exemplified in the Netherlands Labor
Foundation. This organization started as a clandestine group of labor-management
representatives meeting "underground" during the occupation of World War II.
It was agreed that the organization should continue to exist after the war. Both
parties have a high degree of respect and confidence in each other and a strong
desire to settle their own disputes with full consideration for the national welfare.
Government measures, while available in the Netherlands, are largely unused.
2 41
There is, in general, no effort to mobilize public opinion in Europe. The goal
of "social self-management" dictates that the parties should settle their differences
themselves, with help, when necessary, from their own colleagues, through volun-
tarily established methods.242 The absence of any effort to arouse public opinion in
European mediation may stem from the basic concern for the public interest shared
by all parties in the conference, or it may merely mean that the sole responsibility
of determining, rather than representing, the public interest is placed on the medi-
ating parties.
902 (1947).
230 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 80-1-1 to 80-1-49 (1953).
231 1907 6 & 7 Ed VIII Dom. c. 20.
232 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-1-30 (1953).
233 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-1-29 (1953).
234 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-1-31 (1953).
235 70 Colo. 269, 201 Pac. 54 (1921).
236 COLO. PREV. STAT. ANN. § 80-1-32 (1953).
237 OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 4129.11 (Page 1954).
238 The minimum number of persons who must be employed is quite small. Only ten
are required in New Hampshire, but more often the figure is 25, as in Illinois. N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 273:15 (1955), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 20 (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1959).
239 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150, § 3 (1959).
240 See generally McPherson, European Variations on the Mediation Theme, 6 LAB. L.J.
525-36 (1955).
241 Id. at 527-29.
242 Id. at 535.
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Britain has a public policy much like that in the United States. Collective
bargaining is deemed the best method, with a minimum amount of government in-
terference.24 The parties formulate their own codes of conduct and enforcing
machinery; while arbitration agreements are not legally binding, both parties agree
to be bound when submitting an issue to arbitration. The government provides
arbitration and conciliation facilities, but these are not to be used until the parties
have exhausted their own settlement methods. 244 This priority of voluntary over
statutory machinery in mediation is evidenced by the Industrial Court Act of 1919,
which provides:
If there are existing in any trade or industry any arrangements for settle-
ment by conciliation or arbitration of disputes in such trade or industry, or
any branch thereof, made in pursuance of an agreement between organiza-
tions of employers and organizations of workmen representative respectively
of substantial proportions of employers and workmen engaged in that trade
or industry, the Minister shall not, unless with the consent of both parties
to the dispute, and unless and until there has been a failure to obtain settle-
ment by means of those arrangements, refer the matter for settlement or
advice in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section. 245
Canada provides a system of compulsory mediation 246 based on stated prin-
ciples. 247 The procedural requirements for compulsory conciliation are simple. The
parties must give 20 days' notice of a desire to enter collective bargaining negotia-
tions. If they fail to reach an agreement within 20 days, either may request con-
ciliation; and if this fails, the Minister can set up a conciliation board consisting
of three members.2 48 If the conciliation board fails to bring the parties to agree-
ment, the board's recommendation is published, and no strike or lockout is per-
mitted within the next seven days. This seven-day period gives public opinion time
to make itself heard, and it often happens that the parties will reopen negotiations
starting from the basis of the board's recommendation.
The Canadian Cabinet has entered the mediation field on occasion, and in the
1950 Rail Strike, the government resorted to the last means at its disposal. 249 Parlia-
ment was called into session and terminated the strike by ad hoc legislation.
250
Thus, the factor of the force of public opinion in Canadian mediation seems to
be paramount. Delays, however, may be dangerous, whether as a cooling-off period,
or to give public opinion an opportunity to exert pressure. If there is too much
delay, cooling-off periods can become heating-up periods; delays generally help
the employer psychologically, and the worker may become impatient with "legal"
procrastination. A solution to needless delay tactics may be to make agreements
retroactive to the old contract termination date. Despite some of its weaknesses, an
adoption of a system similar to Canada's was recently advocated in Great Britain.251
d) conclusion
A consideration of the mediation systems employed both in this country and
abroad reveals one main underlying principle: Mediation is most successful where
the disputants are allowed an active part in determining both who their mediators
243 For an excellent description of the present British scene see A Giant's Strength: Some
Thoughts on the Constitutional and Legal Position of Trade Unions in England, reprinted in
7 J. PuB. L. 223 (1958).
244 How Industrial Disputes are Settled in Britain, 13 LAB. AND INDUS. IN BRIT. 113-18
(1955).
245 Industrial Court Act of 1919.
246 For a comprehensive discussion of the Canadian system see Kovacs, Compulsory Con-
ciliation in Canada, 10 LAB. L.J. 110 (1959).
247 Stenger, Industrial Conciliation in Canada, 74 INT. LAB. Rxv. 259-78 (1956).
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 For a discussion of some of the constitutional implications of ad hoc labor legislation
in the United States, see Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
251 See, Stenger, supra note 247, at 260.
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will be and what procedures will be employed. 252 Government is allowed to inter-
vene in the public interest, to aid the parties at their request, or, when required, in
response to public demand. However, the decision process is kept primarily the
responsibility of the disputants, and this responsibility is not shifted by mediation. 53
Mediation is thought to be cheapened if too readily available, and continuous
intervention of mediators, it is felt, weakens the collective bargaining process; the
parties begin with the notion that government will enter before a settlement is
reached. 34 Governmental intervention theoretically can occur at least five possible
points: (1) during negotiations (this is known as preventative mediation and
seems to be the direction the FMCS is taking), (2) when the process appears to
be breaking down, (3) when negotiations have temporarily collapsed, (4) after
collective bargaining has finally failed, but before a strike or lockout, (5) after the
strike or lockout.2 5 5 If the government enters before negotiations have collapsed,
there is danger of weakening the bargaining process.25 6 On the other hand, if the
government enters too late in the bargaining, the important psychological role of the
mediator will be lost; the parties will, at this point, be too antagonistic.
3. Arbitration
The arbitration process differs from mediation in that the third party, rather
than assisting the disputants to arrive at a solution, sits as a judge, hears both sides
of the dispute, and resolves it himself; solution is outside the control of the parties.
It does not follow that all types of arbitration are incompatible with the collective
bargaining ideal, but the decision to arbitrate is certainly a more far-reaching step
than the decision to call in a mediator.
The field of arbitration can be divided into two main classes, voluntary and
compulsory. Further, under voluntary arbitration, there is a choice between arbitra-
tion of disputes arising under a previous contract and those met in negotiating a new
contract. The decision to arbitrate may be made a part of the collective bargaining
contract, or it may be made after the dispute arises. The choice between having a
permanent or an ad hoc arbitrator must also be made. On the other hand, if the
decision is made in favor of compulsory arbitration, the procedures must be care-
fully worked out in advance and the limitations of the arbitrator's function must
be clearly defined. With the above distinctions in mind, it is possible to proceed to
a more detailed analysis of arbitration methods.
a) voluntary
The use of arbitration to settle disputes has not always enjoyed great favor.
For some centuries it was held to be against public policy as derogating from the
jurisdiction of the courts. 25 7 Even though not binding, private arbitration was-
and still is-used, mainly because it lacks the formality of the judicial process.
Many still fear that courts are too stiff or abstract to give the parties "justice."
Arbitration, being a middle ground between the violence of the strike and the
interference of the court, has been looked upon with favor in some instances by
the parties, if not by the courts. 25 8 While agreements to arbitrate future disputes
252 See generally, Feinsinger, Private Mediation - Its Potential, 7 LAB. L.J. 493 (1956).
253 Mills, The Role of Mediation in Collective Bargaining, 23 TENN. L. REV. 146-58 (1954).
254 Enarson, Mediation and Education, 7 LAB. L.J. 466-71 (1956).
255 Id. at 468.
256 McPherson maintains that the United States sometimes has a tendency to enter be-
fore mediation is proper, and questions the worth of preventive mediation. If preventive
mediation is just a means of giving mediators something to do during the slack season, there
is more harm done than good. McPherson, European Variations on the Mediation Theme,
6 LAB. L.J. 525-36 (1955).
257 Vynior's Case, 4 Co. 81 b, Trin. Term, 7 Jac. 1 (1609).
258 See generally Bennett, The General Legal Status of Labor Arbitration, 1 So. Tax. L.J.
26 (1954).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
have been considered void at common law,25 9 this deficiency has been overcome by
statute in most states. 260 The present judicial disposition toward arbitration was
expressed by the court in Campbell v. Campbell261 over forty years ago.
It is the policy of the law, as expressed by both English and American
courts, to uphold the peaceful, swift, and inexpensive method of terminating
litigation by arbitration, and such amicable actions, so far from being objects
of censure, are always approved and encouraged because they facilitate
greatly the administration of justice between the parties.
Under modem statutes, contracts providing for resort arbitration are valid.
2 2
The Taft-Hartley Act encourages voluntary arbitration. Section 203(c)
26 3
provides that if the FMCS fails to bring about an agreement by conciliation, it
"shall seek to induce the parties voluntarily to seek other means of settling the
dispute." The "other means" encouraged is voluntary arbitration. Arbitration is
also encouraged indirectly by section 301(a) of the Act264 which makes possible
damage suits for breach of union-management agreements. To avoid the expense
and delay of numerous law suits, the parties often turn to private arbitration.
Voluntary arbitration agreements are of two types: (1) permissive- those
which call for arbitration only if both parties so agree; and (2) mandatory - those
which call for arbitration at the request of either party. The second type is some-
times described as compulsory, but, more accurately, it is "voluntarily adopted
compulsory arbitration.216 Both types fit into the general policy of collective bar-
gaining. Each ultimately rests on the free consent of the parties.2 16 Typically, how-
ever collective bargaining is carried on over a period of years with little or no
resort to arbitration; this may be one indication of the maturity of modem labor
relations. Whether the parties resort to arbitration frequently or seldom, as a matter
of desperation or of policy, voluntary arbitration, where it has been successful, is
usually fashioned by collective bargaining rather than by legislation.
Not all of the governing statutes are unlimited in what they permit to be the
subject of arbitration. General arbitration statutes usually fall into one of the follow-
ing classes:
2 6 7
259 Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 95 P.2d 49 (1939).
260 White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 129 N.E. 753 (1921), held that
a statute which provided that a submission to arbitration" should, in the absence of an express
contrary intention be irrevocable, was not unconstitutional.
261 44 D.C. App. 142 (1915).
262 Recent authority for this general proposition is also found in Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), where the Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements
contained in collective bargaining contracts were specifically enforceable. The decision was
based on section 301 of the LMRA rather than the Arbitration Act, 38 Stat. 103 (1913),
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1952). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion . .. may be brought in any district court of the United States ....
263 LMRA § 203(c).
264 LMRA § 301(a).
265 Bennett, supra note 258, at 29.
266 Witte, The Future of Labor Arbitration - A Challenge 1-19, National Academy of
Arbitrators, Proceedings of the 12th Annual Meeting (McKelvey, ed. 1957).
267 This classification is taken from Bennett, supra note 258, at 34-36. Without regard
to classification, 46 of the 50 states have some form of arbitration statutes. These are em-
bodied in: ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 338-42 (1940); ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-4-1 to 6
1949); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-107 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-107 (1947);
CAL. LAB. LAWS § 65 (West 1956); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-2-5 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 31-117 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.01-57.09 (1952); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 7-101-224 (1935); HAwAII REV. LAWS § 88-16 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-901-910
(1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 20-30 (Smith-Hurd 1941); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2404-
2415 (Burns 1952); IowA CODE ANN. § 90.1-90.14 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
817 (Supp. 1957); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 336.140, 336.150 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:861-76 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, § 15-21 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 89, § 4-22 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150. § 1-10 (1959); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 17.454 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.09 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. § 295.080
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(a) ny controversy whichT-n may ct a he.beween the- parA,,.26 8
(b) any controversy which might be the'subject of a civil action,269
(c) controversies arising out of written contracts, 2 70 and
(d) any existing controversy.27'
Statutes specifically dealing with labor arbitration are normally more limited
in scope, governing one or another of the following situations:
(a) a strike or lockout is threatened or has already occurred,
27 2
(b) disputes which result in strikes, lockouts, boycotts, blacklists, discrimina-
tion, or legal proceedings,
27
(c) disputes which are confined to certain industries,274
(d) those not involving questions which are the subjects of civil actions.27 5
A number of states not only permit arbitration, but make definite legal ma-
chinery available, in the form of either a state agency or ad hoc board; most volun-
tary arbitration in this country is conducted on an ad hoc basis. This is unfortunate
because it has been demonstrated that a provision in the labor contract appointing
a permanent arbitrator is both beneficial and workable 276 Ad hoc arbitration should,
at best, be looked on as a transition stage before the establishment of some form of
permanent arbitration.
Voluntary arbitration of industrial disputes growing out of the collective bar-
gaining process necessarily involves a wide range of situations, but basically the dis-
putes may be grouped into two classifications. Ninety per cent of collective bargain-
ing contracts today provide for arbitration as the terminal step in the grievance
procedure. On the other hand, only two per cent of the requests for arbitration
panels coming to the FMCS involve disputes over future contract terms.2 7 7 The low
percentage of arbitration provisions concerning future terms would indicate a dis-
trust of the ability of arbitrators to handle subjects such as wages and hours. This
caution may be justified if the arbitrator is given powers which are too broad. In
(1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-901-909 (1947); NB. REv. STAT. § 48-801-823
(1952); NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 614.010-614.080 (1957); N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 273:12-27
(1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:13-1-9 (1940); N.Y. LAB. LAWS §§ 1452-54 (McKinney
1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-36.5 (1955); N.D. REv. CODE § 34-1004 (Supp. 1957);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4129.01-09 (Pages 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 4
(1954); ORE. REv. STAT. § 662.405 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5. § 1 (1958); S.C. CODE
§ 40-301 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-502 (1956); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 239-49
(1959); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-16 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 501-13 (1959);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-503-07 (1957); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.08-12 (1956); W. Va. CODE
ANN. § 5499 (1955); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.11 (1947); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 37-
12 (1945).
268 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Nevada, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Bennett, supra note 258.
269 Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Ibid.
270 California, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania provide for both existing and
future disputes, while Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York provide only for future
disputes. Ibid.
271 Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Nevada, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Ibid.
272 Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and
Vermont. Ibid.
273 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, and Wis-
consin. Ibid.
274 Arizona, Kansas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and Oklahoma.
275 Illinois, Montana, Ohio, and Oregon. Ibid.
276 For a discussion of one system, see Davey, The John Deere-UAW Permanent Arbitra-
tion System, National Academy of Arbitrators, Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting 161-
92 (1957).
277 Personal communication from J. F. Finnegan, Director, FMCS, in Davey, Labor Ar-
bitration: A Current Appraisal, 9 IND. & L.A. REL. REv. 85-94 (1955).
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the grievance proceedings, there is a genuine desire by both parties to avoid strikes
over relatively small matters. Therefore, arbitration is used as a substitute for the
strike and generally operates under a no-strike clause; 275 in most cases the arbitra-
tor is able to find in the contract terms adequate standards for his award. However,
in disputes over future contract terms the arbitrator usually has no agreed-upon
standards; to make the procedure effective the disputants must plainly set out what
is to be decided. If the parties exercise care in canalizing the arbitrator's discretion
through a submission agreement, thus articulating workable standards, and if the
presentation is factually thorough and accurate, wage arbitration can conceivably
be supported as an alternative to a test of economic power.17 9 Professor Bernstein
concludes on the basis of a 1945-1950 study of 209 disputes that "in general and
in the long run there tends to be little difference in effect if wages alre arbitrated
rather than negotiated."
280
The basic essentials of a labor arbitration policy which will perform an ancil-
lary function to the collective bargaining process might be stated as follows:281
(1) The arbitration award must be swiftly enforceable.
(2) Present agreements and agreements to arbitrate in the future must be
enforced, overriding the common law.
(3) A means must be provided for naming the impartial arbitrator if one can-
not be agreed upon.
(4) The stability and finality of the award must be assured.
(5) The subject matter which may be arbitrated and procedures for deciding
same must be clearly set out.
(6) There must be provisions for judicial review, but the judge should in no
case re-arbitrate the issue.
b) compulsory
The second basic alternative in this field is compulsory arbitration. It is perhaps
tho last step in the final rejection of the philosophy of a competitive economy with
industrial disputes resolved through a system of free collective bargaining. There
has been no federal legislation on the subject, other than wartime emergency pro-
visions, and the measures taken by the states have been uniformly abortive. Since
the Australian system of compulsory arbitration is recognized as the leader in the
field, it is necessary to examine it briefly so that a more intelligent appraisal of our
own attempts may be made.
The commerce powers of the Australian constitution have not been as broadly
construed as those in the United States Constitution; 282 the adoption of compul-
sory arbitration had to be made under an enabling amendment. 2 3 The provision
itself was not self-executing so the legislature established a Commonwealth Con-
ciliation and Arbitration Court.28 4 The court has complete authority to settle indus-
trial disputes and will override conflicting state law.
285
Only unions or trade organizations are recognized before the court. Employees,
who have no recourse individually, are bound by the union decision. No employee
can "cease work in service of his employer" merely because the employer is a mem-
278 Taylor, The Effectuation of Arbitration By Collective Bargaining, National Academy
of Arbitrators, Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting 20-41 (1957).
279 Davey, supra note 277.
280 BERNSTEIN, THE ARBITRATION OF WAGES, 112 (1954).
281 Syme, The Essentials of a Labor Arbitration Law, 39 A.B.A.J. 832 (1953).
282 See generally Ross, Industrial Arbitration in Australia - The Constitutional History,
30 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1945). For a comprehensive history of the English and Australian
background and a basic outline of the present system of Australian compulsory arbitration,
see PORTUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION LAW (1958).
283 AUSTRALIAN CONST. § 51.
284 Ross, supra note 282.
285 Ibid.
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ber of an employers' organization or has testified in an arbitration proceeding. 286
Tight control of the unions is provided by requiring the union to submit its con-
stitution and by-laws to the court for approval. The court may disallow the regis-
tration on the grounds that it is illegal, oppressive, has unreasonable admission
requirements, or for failure of the union to disclose its true financial position.287
The positive benefits resulting from the system are hard to single out. While
statistics cannot give the whole picture, the Australian man-days lost due to indus-
trial conflicts is slightly higher than in a majority of the nations following a free
collective b~rgaining philosophy but substantially less than in the United States.288
From a statistical point of view it is questionable that anything positive in the way
of reduction in industrial conflict can be attributed to compulsory arbitration. The
Australian worker's standard of living appears to compare favorably with that of
the worker in this country, but this is not necessarily to be attributed to compulsory
arbitration. It is now safe to say that recourse to compulsory arbitration in Aus-
tralia is, in effect, available as a complete substitute for collective bargaining, not
merely a supplement.
28 9
In the United States, resort to compulsory arbitration has been sporadic and
unsuccessful. The present extent of federal arbitration legislation is limited to the
FMCS, and is not compulsory. Considerable state activity in this area has occurred
from time to time .29 The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act2 9' of 1920 was
the first peacetime attempt at compulsory arbitration. The act created an industrial
court with power on its own initiative, or on request, to hear disputes involving the
public interest in the industries pertaining to food, clothing, fuel, transportation,
public utilities, or common carriers. The plan was declared unconstitutional in
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,292 as violative of the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment. If wages can be set so high that the
employer is forced to operate at a loss, the award then becomes confiscatory. The
portions of the act not invalidated have remained in effect293 but have not been
in operation because of union opposition and lack of appropriations.
294
A general provision in the Oklahoma constitution requires that every license
given to mining or public service corporations contain an arbitration of labor dis-
putes stipulation, but there has been no implementing legislation.2 95 Following the
major postwar strikes, there was a rash of public utility compulsory arbitration
legislation brought about by adverse public opinion. New Jersey, Florida, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin all
passed such legislation in 1947.296 The New Jersey act was declared unconstitu-
tional for failure to provide sufficient standards for an administrative agency.
2 9 7
The Wisconsin act ran afoul of the federal pre-emption doctrine,298 and there has
been no further state activity in the field of compulsory arbitration. The recent
286 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, § 9(2) (4) (1904-34).
287 Id. at §§ 58D, 60.
288 Foenander, The Achievement and Significance of Industrial Regulation in Australia,
"75 INT'L LAB. REV. 104-18 (1957). Table at 107.
289 Ibid. However, to say that the granting of government subsidies would be a desirable
solution is to reveal a mode of thinking contrary to the general sentiment in the United
States.
290 Legislation to compel arbitration has been proposed from time to time, but has never
been enacted. See, e.g., Ball, Burton, Hatch Bill, S. 1171, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), and
the LMRA discussion of the proposal, 93 CONG. REc. 3835 (1947).
291 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-601, 603, 606-28, 635 (1949).
292 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
293 Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
294 Bennett, supra note 258, at 39.
295 OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 42.
296 Bennett, supra note 258, at 39-40.
297 State v. Traffic Tel. Workers Fed. 2 N.J. 235, 66 A.2d 616 (1949).
298 Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
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The ultimate future of compulsory arbitration in the United States is not clear.
Senator Taft has summed up the case for the opposition:
Basically the solution of our labor problems must rest on a free economy
and on free collective bargaining .... The right to strike can be modified
in cases which do not involve the basic questions of wages, prices, and work-
ing conditions. But if we impose compulsory arbitration . . . I do not see
how in the end we can escape a collective economy.3 00
The Senator then went on to note that possibly compulsory arbitration could be
limited to public utilities, but even here there would be a problem of where to draw
the line. Coal and steel are just as important to the public interest as are thosd
industries usually categorized as public utilities. The recent amendments to the
Taft-Hartley Act, as we have seen, could result in compulsory arbitration being tried
on a state level. Statutes presently exist which provide for it. Yet there is little likeli-
hood that any comprehensive legislation embodying a commitment to compulsory
arbitration will be adopted on the national level in the foreseeable future.
B. Methods of Maintaining Production
Having considered measures aimed at facilitating or achieving settlement, we
may now turn to governmental activity basically designed to mitigate the effects of
industrial disputes, or to protect some public interest by maintaining production.
Analytically, these may be divided into those aimed at both the employer and the
employee, those primarily aimed at the employer, and those primarily aimed at the
employee.
1. Emergency Strike Injunction
The injunction has not been adopted on a state level as a method of dealing
with labor disputes giving rise to emergency situations. Since 1947, under the Taft-
Hartley Act, such an approach has been followed on the national level. It seeks to
maintain the status quo for a period of 80 days. Senator Taft believed that "in
most instances the force of public opinion would make itself sufficiently felt in this
80-day period to bring about a peaceful termination of the controversy."3 01 After the
80-day period, he felt that Congress could
enact legislation on the spot to cope with the particular situation. It might
provide for seizure, another injunction, or arbitration - or Congress might
decide not to do anything. But whatever it did would be tailored to the
needs of the case; and the possibly enormous government power would be
off the books as soon as the strike had ended.302
When a threatened or actual strike or lockout gives rise to a national emergency,
the Taft-Hartley Act prescribes specific procedures.303 The President must first
decide that the situation imperils national health or safety; he may then appoint a
board of inquiry to make a report on the facts and the issues.3 0 4 Following the
report, he may direct the attorney general to seek an injunction to prevent or end
the strike or lockout in any Federal district court.305
Before the injunction can be issued the district court must find that the situa-
tion substantially affects commerce, and that if the strike or lockout occurs or con-
299 See generally Bennett, supra note 258.
300 93 CONG. REC. 3835-36 (1947).
301 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947).
302 "Mr. Taft Proposes," Fortune, Jan., 1953, p. 63.
303 LMRA §§ 206-10.
304 LMRA § 206.
305 LMRA § 208.
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tinues, it will imperil national health or safety.308 The emergency need not involve
a nation-wide or industry-wide strike,30 7 nor imperil both the national safety and
health.30 8 The injunction, when granted, may extend to all participants in the
dispute, not merely those directly involved in the strike or lockout 9 and it may
be granted without regard to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.310 The injunction may,
as well, be granted broad enough to cover a possible slowdown.311 The district court's
order is, of course, subject to appellate review. 12 The President, at the end of 60
days, must reconvene the board of inquiry to report to him on the situation. Then,
within 15 days, the NLRB must take a secret ballot of the employees to see if they
wish to accept the employer's last offer.313 Upon certification of the result within
five days, or settlement of the dispute, whichever occurs first, the injunction must
be discharged. When the motion to discharge the injunction has been granted, as
it must be, the President must make a full report with his recommendation to
Congress.
14
Between 1947 and 1952 President Truman invoked these provisions on 10
occasions, seven of which were in 1948.31r Four of the seven times that the President
felt that it was necessary to request an injunction after the board of inquiry's report,
a stoppage was not prevented. Twice, 80-day delays were achieved, but the strikes
were quickly resumed after the injunction was discharged. The United Mine Work-
ers ignored the injunction in both 1948316 and 1950.317 One authority has sum-
marized the data by saying
that in four out of ten cases the futility of the Taft-Hartley Act was de-
monstrated. In a fifth case its machinery was found inapplicable and in
others, so far as the eye can see, the Act did not seriously affect the out-
come.3
18
The latest instance of its use was by President Eisenhower in the recent steel strike;
a settlement was reached there before the end of the 80-day period 31 9
The provisions themselves have been attacked as too vague,3 20 although it might
be noted that if they were too specific, the flexibility required to deal with the full
range of possible emergency situations would be lacking. The cooling-off period has
been termed "at best meaningless, and at worst harmful in relation to the collective
306 LMRA § 208(a) (i). The power of the court to hear these cases has been attacked on
the grounds that a "case or controversy" was lacking. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The argu-
ment, however, was rejected in United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 202 F.2d
132 (2d Cir.), cert. denied before judgment, 344 U.S. 915 (1953), reported in the District
Court sub nom., United States v. American Locomotive Co., 109 F. Supp. 78 (W.D.N.Y.
1952). See 66 HAv. L. REv. 1531 (1953).
307 United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1953) (in-
volved atomic energy program).
308 United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
309 United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
310 Anti-Injunction Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). See United States
v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
311 United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
312 LMRA, § 208(c).
313 LMRA, § 209(b).
314 LMRA, § 210.
315 See generally, Warren, National Emergency Provisions, 4 LAB. L.J. 130 (1953);
Rehmus, The Operation of the National Emergency Provisions of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 62 YALE L.J. 1047 (1953); Cullen, The Taft-Hartley Act in National
Emergency Disputes, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 15 (1953).
316 When the UMW went out on strike in March 1948 over pensions, President Truman
obtained an injunction. Before the strike was finally settled both John L. Lewis and the
union were fined a total of $710,000 for contempt.
317 The coal strike of 1950 again prompted President Truman to ask for an injunction.
This time Lewis ostensibly ordered the miners to return to work. Both he and the union
were found not guilty in subsequent contempt proceedings. United States v. UMW, 89 F.
Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1950), dismissed as moot, 190 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
318 Cox, The Taft-Hartley Act: An Evaluation of Experience, reprinted in SISTER,
READINGS IN LABOR EcoNoMIcS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 501 (1956).
319 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1960, p. 1, col. 8.
320 Warren, National Emergency Provisions, 4 LAB. L.J. 130 (1953).
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bargaining process."32' The inherent necessity for haste has also been decried, point-
ing out that the "board of inquiry is nothing but a whistle-stop on the road to an
injunction. 322 It may also be noted that the board is denied the first prerequisite
for marshalling public opinion to force a settlement -the power to make recom-
mendations.3 23 Senator Taft himself felt the last-offer vote was a meaningless
formality.
3 24
Few have had praise for the present national emergency provisions. Such
criticism should perhaps be tempered by noting the observation that they have
not been used enough to justify any conclusive evaluation. As one critic puts it:
The present emergency procedures are much better than the prevailing
weight of critical opinion holds, simply because ... many critics ... when
evaluating the Taft-Hartley Act . . . measure it against the ideal and
abstract standard of a law that would prevent all emergency strikes, while




Plant seizure, like the emergency injunction, is not primarily a device to settle
the dispute. Its purpose, instead, is to resume production under government aus-
pices.326 Seizure has been employed on both the federal and state level, although
its peacetime use has been restricted almost exclusively to the states.
a) federal
No federal statute presently authorizes seizure as a general procedure in indus-
trial conflict.3 27 Such authorization was specifically rejected when the Taft-Hartley
Act was under consideration.3 28 Congress apparently felt that such a procedure
would unduly interfere with the collective bargaining process.3 29 The Constitution,
however, grants to Congress the power to take private property for public use,330
subject only to the limitation that just compensation must be afforded.33' Despite
some historical practice to the contrary,3 3 2 it is clear today that the President is
powerless, without statutory authority, to seize private property during a strike
under the guise of a national emergency.
3 3 3
Our national experience with seizure where industrial conflict is involved, thus,
is of limited value. When it has occurred, iv was usually during a period of war;s
consequently, any evaluation of its peacetime effectiveness is practically impossible.
321 Rehmus, supra note 315, at 1059.
322 Id. at 1055.
323 LMRA, § 206.
324 "Mr. Taft Proposes," Fortune, Jan., 1953, p. 63.
325 Cullen, supra note 315, at 29.
326 This alone presents interesting incidental problems. After seizure, is the state liable,
where general immunity no longer obtains, for the torts of its "new employees"? Rider
v. Julian, 365 Mo. 313, 282 S.W.2d 484 (1955), held that it was not. The decision was
based on a construction of the Missouri Statute, Mo. ANN. STAT., §§ 295.010 - 295.210
(1947), that seizure was not meant to raise the employer-employee relation. A similar re-
sult, therefore, would not necessarily obtain elsewhere.
327 See the appendix of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 615 (1952), for a comprehensive listing of Congressional statutes
which do provide for presidential seizure.
328 93 CONG. REC. 3637-45 (1947).
329 93 CONG. Rac. 3835-36 (1947).
330 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8(18).
331 U.S. CONST. amend V.
332 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson notes in dissent in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952), that President Lincoln's action in seizing the rail and telegraph
lines leading to Washington was without statutory authority, and that later when a bill
was passed "ratifying the seizure," its sponsors declared its purpose was merely to con-
firm a power already possessed.
333 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
334 Since 1917 there have been 68 instances of executive seizure; 49 were during World
War II, three in World War I, three in 1941, three during the Korean War, and 10 be-
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b) state
Five states presently have seizure statutes designed as methods of intervention
in industrial disputes.3 35 Most of these were passed during the period of industrial
strife around 1947. Some, however, like Maryland's, were passed to deal with spe-
cific strikes.3 s Almost uniformly seizure is at the discretion of the governor.3 3 7
Virginia uniquely provides that the company may refuse to turn over its facilities;
the governor then must apply to the court for a rule requiring the company to show
cause why they should not be surrendered. 338 Most of the acts apply only to public
utilities, although, as in New Jersey, the definition of "public utility" may be quite
broad.
33 9
Several of the statutes also forbid strikes during seizure.340 Missouri goes one
step further and provides for a loss of seniority for those refusing to work.3 41 It
should be noted here, however, that it is generally thought that a state may not
abridge the right to strike.3 42 Justification for the no-strike provision is usually sought
in the exclusion of the government from the definition of employer in the Taft-
Hartley Act.343 Although it has been asserted, the constitutional character of the
right has not been adjudicated.3 44 Possible federal pre-emption has also been
avoided on an inherent police power argument.3 43 The stigma of involuntary




That seizure is a constitutional "regulation" and not a "taking" was once
undoubtedly an interesting contention.3 47 Today, however, there is little question
that it constitutes a taking which, under the 14th Amendment, requires that just
compensation be paid.348 Most of the statutes so provide, although there is little
uniformity in the schemes employed to determine the proper compensation. 349
tween VJ Day and the Korean War, nine of which were within 10 months of VJ Day.
Forty-four of the occasions involved non-compliance with action of a government board
during war or emergency, and the War Department or the Army was charged with carry-
ing out the orders 32 times. Federal Seizures in Labor Management Disputes, 1917-1952,
76 MONTHLY LABOR Rzv. 611 (1953).
335 These states are Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and Virginia. See
notes 336-41, infra.
336 After everything else had failed to end a 37-day strike at the Baltimore Transit com-
pany, the General Assembly held a Grand Inquest, a device which, although provided for,
had not previously been used. It gives the legislature broad powers to demand records and
summon witnesses. See generally Seff, Legality of the Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act,
16 MD. L. Rv. 304 (1956). Maryland's statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 14-24 (1957),
was the end product of the Inquest.
337 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150B, § 4(B) (1957).
338 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-516 (1959).
339 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-523 (1959). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-13B-16 (Supp. 1959) in-
cludes autobuses, bridge companies, canal companies, electric light, heat, and power com-
panies, ferries and steamboats, gas companies, pipe line companies, railroads, sewer com-
panies, steam and water power companies, street railways, telegraph and telephone com-
panies, tunnel companies, water companies. In short, any concern that is directly regu-
lated by the state is subject to seizure.
340 MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 150B, § 4(B)(3)(6) (1957).
341 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 295-200 (1949). See Shute, A Survey of Missouri Labor Law, 18 Mo.
L.R. 93, 160-72 (1953).
342 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees of America v. WERE, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
343 LMRA, § 2(2).
344 A recent Missouri case which the Surpreme Court dismissed after holding it about
12 months clearly presented the issue. But see the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Dorchy
v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
345 See Lehrer, The Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act, 7 LAB. L.J. 607 (1956);
Seff, Legality of Maryland Public Utilities Disputes Act, 16 MD. L.R. 304 (1956).
346 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-13B-15 (Supp. 1959).
347 See generally, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 184 (1950).
348 Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S.
114 (1951).
349 See, e.g., Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1950), aft'd, 341
U.S. 114 (1951).
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Massachusetts, as one example, equates just compensation with profits, but provides
that the existence of the labor dispute may be considered in determining profits.350
A more complex problem, compensation to the employee, is also not treated with
uniformity. 5
Some of the statutes incidentally provide inducements to settle. Virginia relies
on collective bargaining, but specifies that wages are to remain the same during the
seizure.35 2 New Jersey provides for compulsory arbitration within 10 days after
seizureAs 3 With the exception of Hawaii's, 54 all of the statutes specifically provide
for return to private owners at the end of the dispute.
3 55
Experience under seizure has been uneven.3 5 6 In a Hawaiian dock strike there
was a 176-day stoppage of all shipping; non-union men had to be hired when
most of the union men refused to obey an injunction issued along with the seizure
order. The government was able to maintain only about one-half the previous rate
of work. 5 7 New Jerseys s and Virginia359 have not had better results. And, since
1952, after the Supreme Court declared a Wisconsin labor relations act providing
for representation proceedings invalid on the grounds of federal pre-emption,160 the
states have apparently been reluctant to employ seizure, and have instead attempted
to foster voluntary conciliation.3 61
Generally, then, we may conclude that the record of the various seizure statutes
shows no pattern of uniformity. "The figures . .. are sporadic. The inconsistent
pattern and indefinite trends.., suggest that the state laws have not been effective
in reducing strikes substantially or consistently."362
3. Employee Draft
Similar to plant seizure, employee draft aims at preventing a production stoppage
by inducting the work force into the armed forces. It represents, perhaps, the ultimate
breakdown of the collective bargaining process. Neither the federal government nor
any of the states has adopted so drastic a solution as a permanent policy in dealing
with industrial conflict. It remains, however, at least a theoretical possibility, and in
two situations, one federal and one state, it almost became a reality.
a) federal
On May 25, 1946, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress. The
railroads, then under government control, were experiencing a crippling strike. Mr.
Truman requested
the Congress immediately to authorize . . .[him] to draft into the armed
forces of the United States all workers who . . .strike against their govern-
ment. 363
350 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150B, § 4(B)(1) (1957).
351 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56-519 (1959) (same as prior to seizure).
352 Ibid. See also Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186 Va. 481, 43 S.E.2d 10 (1947).
353 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-13B-20 (Supp. 1959).
354 HAWAII REv. CODE § 92-7 (1955). Termination of seizure is exclusively at the discre-
tion of the governor.
355 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150B, § 4(B)(3)(C) (1957).
356 See generally Sussna, State Intervention in Public Utility Labor Management Rela-
tions, 9 LAB. L.J. 35 (1958).
357 See generally Goldberg, Settlement of Hawaiian Longshoremen's Strike, 69 MONTHLY
LAB. R. 653 (1949). It is interesting to note that Hawaiian trade with the mainland which
was almost entirely with West Coast ports was diverted to East and Gulf ports because
of an agreement by the shippers and union on the West coast that the dockworkers did not
have to unload non-union cargoes.
358 Kennedy, The Handling of Emergency Disputes, reprinted in SHISTEP, supra note 318,
at 521-28 (1956).
359 See France, Seizure in Emergency Disputes in Virginia, 7 IND. LAB. REIL. R.v. 347
(1954); Lowuden, Public Utility Seizure in Virginia, 41 VA. L.R. 397 (1955).
360 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951):
361 Sussna, supra note 356, at 35.
362 Id. at 36.
363 92 CoNG. REc. 5753 (1946).
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That afternoon, under suspended rules, the House passed 64 a bill authorizing the
President, when in any plant in possession of the United States there was a strike,
lockout, or slowdown, to declare by proclamation the existence of a national emer-
gency. The heart of the bill, Section 7, provided that any employee who refused to
work within 24 hours of the effective date of the proclamation
shall be inducted into the Army of the United States at such time, in such
manner (with or without an oath) and on such terms and conditions as may
be prescribed by the President as being necessary in his judgment to provide
for the emergency
3 65
The Senate, however, referred the bill to committee before considering it on the
floor. Senator Taft's query of Senator Barkley, the speaker for the bill -Would the
strikers, if they refused to work, be shot as traitors? -resulted in sober second
thoughts.38 8 Senator Wagner's motion to strike Section 7 then carried.3 67 The bill
was finally passed,38 8 but it was never reported back from the Senate-House con-
ference committee.
b) state
In early 1946, a dispute developed between the Virginia Electric Power Com-
pany and a local union.3, 9 The union gave notice of intention to strike, and refused
to attend a conference suggested by Governor Tuck. On March 22, the Governor
declared a state of emergency; relying on his power as commander-in-chief of the
land and naval forces of the Commonwealth, 370 he ordered out a part of the "unor-
ganized militia," which consisted of all able-bodied male citizens between 16 and
55 . 71 The unit, which was composed of the employees of the power company, was
designated as the "emergency laws executing unit."37 2 The order, however, was
suspended until the strike became effective, and then it commanded the unit to
seize the facilities of the power company and perform the same services each indi-
vidual had performed prior to induction. On March 30, before the strike began,
negotiations were resumed and settlement reached. Governor Tuck then declared
the emergency at an end, and issued an order specifying that
all persons who were drafted into the emergency are forthwith discharged
honorably and returned to their former status in the unorganized militia
of the commonwealth.... 74
The traditional test of a governor's power to call out the militia is the existence
of a serious emergency.375 Although his judgment is controlling, the power may not
be exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.3 76 It is possible that the exercise
of the power in labor disputes might run afoul of the ban of the 13th Amendment
on involuntary servitude.3 7 7 Yet public service has to date not been considered within
the prohibition of the amendment.3 78 Objections to general military service,3 79 jury
364 The vote was 306 to 13, 112 not voting. Id. at 5754.
365 Ibid.
366 92 CoNG. REc. 5780 et seq. (1946).
367 The motion was carried 70 to 13, 12 not voting. Id. at 5918.
368 Ibid.
369 For a general account of the whole strike and draft situation, see 33 VA. L. Rv. 100
(1947).
370 VA. CoNsT. art. V, § 73. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 56-528 (1959).
371 Exec. Order of March 29, 1946 as reprinted in 92 CONG. REC. 5791 (1946).
372 Ibid. The Record also contains here a copy of the individual notice of draft and order
to report.
373 92 CONG. RPc. 5794 (1946).
374 Ibid.
375 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454,
143 Pae. 947 (1914). Accord, opinion of Attorney General of Virginia reprinted in 92
CONG. Rac. 5794-98 (1946).
376 Ibid.
377 33 VA. L. Rnv. 100, 106 (1947).
378 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916).
379 Wolfe v. United States, 149 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1945).
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service, 8 0 work on public roads,3 " and service by seamen 3 2 have all been overruled.
The issue would turn on the public character of the service, although "the total effect
of the order might well spell out involuntary servitude." 33 One authority, as well,
has advanced the proposition that the decision to provide public services is legislative,




To attempt to offer a detailed discussion of the problems raised by the recent
steel strike is clearly beyond, the scope of this survey. Yet certain principles may be
noted, and factors pointed out, which should be considered in any re-evaluation of
America's national commitment to collective bargaining. Initially, it should be recog-
nized, of course, that our national policy in industrial relations involves questions
which go to the very heart of the present distribution of social, economic, and political
power.38 5 Industrialization radically transformed an older social order;38 6 it also
gave rise to a series of crucial problems which society has not yet learned to cope
with.
Industrialization placed the machine between man and man and destroyed a
social order in which it was possible to exercise a measure of personal responsibility.
The trade union movement itself is, perhaps, best understood as an unconscious
attempt to regain this ability by the introduction of the bilateral decision where
early industrialization had placed the unilateral decision.8 7 The right to organize,
moreover, flows ultimately from "the institutional characteristics of a technically
advanced society which threaten the right of the individual to cry out aloud against
that which he feels to be oppressive. . ."S The progressive growth in legal attitudes
toward the labor movement is, at least, an implicit recognition of this fact.
Implicit in our present approach is the recognition that unionization is not a
problem which can be solved. Rather it is a movement which has to date resisted
imprisonment in any ideological strait jacket, keyed only to a particular factual
situation.389 The quest for a final solution to the "labor problem," therefore, ought
380 State v. Scott, 36 W. Va. 704, 15 S.E. 405 (1892).
381 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
382 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
383 Supra note 377.
384 Supra note 377, at 108.
385 Professor Edwin E. Witte has recognized an unfortunate tendency, particularly in
view of the character of industrial relations, for parties
to align themselves on every issue from a class conflict point of view.
What labor is for, management opposes; and vice versa . . . . They do
not grasp the opposing position and make little attempt to understand
it . . . . [E]ach side professes great concern for the general public in-
terest but always identifies its position with that of the general public.
Quoted in YODER & HENEMAN, LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS 236 (1959).
386 For a succinct but penetrating description of this transformation, see TANNENBAUM,
A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 32-48 (1950).
387 See generally, TANNENBAUM, supra note 386.
388 Roberts, Industrial Relations, in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 20TH CEN-
TURY 389 (1959).
389 The issue of "managerial prerogatives" is illustrative. Neil W. Chamberlain has ob-
served that they are
something which changes over time, reflecting changing economic and
social relationships . . . . [J]ust as the bargaining process itself has
undergone modification . . . so the issues to which that process is di-
rected are not a fixed category, but, rather, are reflective of the perpetually
changing complexion of economic society. Quoted in McNAUGHTON &
LAZAR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT, 456 (1954).
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to be recognized as essentially fruitless. 390 For all that, as a restless power flux in our
rapidly changing society, the trade union movement may be channeled, and, per-
haps, given positive direction. But to this end, procedural rather than substantive
rules should be preferred.3 91 The inadequacy of any substantive legal formalization
today will surely be demonstrated tomorrow.39 2 Any proposed procedural changes
to channel the dynamic development of the labor movement within our society must,
as well, if they are to possess survival value, take into consideration the total charac-
ter of man.
Modem investigation in industrial psychology has shown the great im-
portance of human relations in industry. Out of many surveys on the causes
of strikes that have been undertaken in recent years, none put down wage
difficulties as the chief cause.
393
Too often today the trade union movement is viewed in terms of a philosophical
heritage which assumed. "that the economic interest is the governing, perhaps even
the exclusive, concern of the human being."39 4 Ricardo, Smith, and even Marx,
each left conceptual tools inadequate to explain the phenomenon of man in an
industrial society.
If, also, the rise of the union movement is best understood as a quest to re-
establish personal fulfillment, which ultimately requires the exercise of personal
responsibility, reforms in the present legal structure of industrial relations must
create a situation where there is a maximum opportunity for the exercise of personal
- therefore decentralized - decision. And, in the process, the twin evils of pluralis-
tic anarchy and state authoritarianism must be avoided.395
The simple proposal which ignores big differences in industries 96 and stages
390 John T. Dunlap has made the following pertinent observation about the so-called
emergency dispute. There is no convincing way to still the
insistent question: then what? If mediation fails, then what? If fact-
finding and recommendations do not produce settlement, then what? If
seizure and injunction fail, then what? If the use of the armed forces
or putting workers in the militia fail, then what? If you put the leaders
in jail and there is still no settlement, then what? The quest for the
end of this road is a dangerous illusion. . .. There can be no . . .
guarantees. Dunlap, Emergency Disputes: Some Basic Guideposts, in
READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 513-14
(1956).
391 One authority has compared the institution of collective bargaining to the tradition
of the common law, and pointed out that its genius for success lies in a "very firm pro-
cedural framework for a very flexible corpus of substantive rules . . . ." Kahn-Freund,
Labor Law, in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 20TH CENTURY 262-63 (1959).
392 The inadequacy of legal definitions in a rapidly changing industry is today being
brought out by automation. New occupations, such as programmer and machine super-
visors, resist the easy cataloging of "management-supervisors" or "labor-employee" of the
LMRA, § 2(3) and (11). See Aronson, Automation: Challenge to Collective Bargaining?
in NEW DIMENSIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 52 (1959). The German experience with
co-determination is also illustrative. Perhaps the most radical change it has introduced has
been the trial and error method. The traditional German penchant for theory and social
engineering has had to give way to the pressure of a new, not yet fully understood, institu-
tion. See generally, SPIRo, THE POLITICS OF GERMAN Co-DETERMINATION (1958).
393 NEWMAN, Co-RESPONSmILITY IN INDUSTRY 113 (1955).
394 Tannenbaum, supra note 387, at 52.
395 The Industrial Organization Act passed by the Netherlands in 1950 recognizes thisprinciple:It is impossible to draw a natural line between that which can be regulated
on the one hand by Government and on the other by the industrial
bodies. The definition of the two tasks in concrete form is a matter of
efficiency. The first rule which applies to achieve an efficient organiza-
tion of society is that the state must not assume tasks which can be ful-
filled as well or better by inferior bodies in society. Quoted in Newman,
supra note 393, at 133-34.
396 The advocacy of the abolition of industry-wide bargaining, for example, ignores the
lack of product competition in the steel industry, while the reverse is true in the auto in-
dustry. See generally, Goldfinger and Kassalow, Trade Union Behavior in Wage Bargaining,
in NEw CONCEPTS IN WAGE DETERMINATION 51-82 (1957).
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of industrialization must also be rejected. 9 7 Too often one plan is seen as the solu-
tion to all the labor problems, however vastly different, of the nation. Finally, the
inherent limitation of any legal approach ought to be recognized.
It is clear ... that the question of the legal status, and hence legal obliga-
tions, of unions must be recognized as occupying but one sector of the broad
front along which a realistic approach to the problem of union responsibility
can alone be made. New legal solutions may provide part of the answer; in a
political democracy they cannot provide anything like a complete answer.398
Dynamic social forces are not easily contained in the judicial process. The labor
movement today is too often an issue of partisan politics. The political consensus that
would admit of workable standards, under which significant labor problems could
be submitted to impartial tribunals, does not exist. The transferring of our more
crucial labor issues "into one of those spheres which are supposed to be outside
partisan politics would merely result in politicizing that sphere as well."39 9 The
result, at best, would be a more sophisticated level of collective bargaining, and, at
the extreme, possibly the beginning of a planned economy.400 Finally, it should be
noted that the first prerequisite for a sound legal approach - the ascertainable fact
situation - is almost by definition lacking in our present stage of industrialization. 401
Labor disputes are disputes largely about principles, about social and eco-
nomic theory, about business prospects at home and abroad next year and
five years hence, and cannot be resolved by any finding of fact.
402
The role of law in the settlement of industrial disputes is basically peripheral.403
It can set and maintain conditions under which a collective bargaining process can
operate; it cannot make the agreement for the parties.
40 4
397 The Taft-Hartley Act, for example, was passed to readjust the power equilibrium of
union-management relation. Yet, although there is an almost total lack of empirical data,
objective observers feel that its operational effect, with some minor exceptions, has not
been substantial on established collective bargaining relations. It has had, however, sub-
stantial impact in impeding the unionization of the South, an effect possibly not intended.
See, generally, Davey, The Operational Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act Upon Collective
Bargaining Relations, in Nnw DIMENSIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 179-96 (1959).
398 Martin, Legal Personality and the Trade Union, in LEGAL PERSONALITY AND POLIT-
ICAL PLURALISM 42 (1958). The record of Australian compulsory arbitration clearly de-
monstrates the inadequacy of a purely legal approach. The system has tended to become
an end in itself. Attention is concentrated on the legal prerequisites to making the present
ystem workable rather than being directed toward determining the proper place of the union
in the total structure of a political democracy. Id. at 41.
399 SPIRo, supra note 392, at 7, commenting on the German experience.
400 See generally, Kerr, Labor's Income Share and the Labor Movement, in NEw Cox-
CEPTS IN WAGE DETERMINATION 260-98 (1957).
401 Dr. Kerr makes this point quite graphically in regard to merely ascertaining what
labor's share of our national income is. He feels that possibly the whole concept "labor
share" is outmoded today. Id. at 297.
402 Stewart & Couper, The Limitations of Fact Findings in Industrial Disputes in SHISTER,
READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 518 (1956).
403 One author has suggested a solution similar to that which resulted in the Railway
Labor Act. He suggested that Congress formally request the parties concerned in those basic
industries, which could, if struck, give rise to a national emergency, to submit within a
year their suggestions for mitigating such disputes. He would make the subject of emer-
gency disputes itself an issue for collective bargaining. Dunlap, Emergency Disputes: Some
Basic Guideposts, in READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 517 (1956).
404 This survey was prepared by G. R. Blakey, A.B., LL.B., and Matthew T. Hogan, A.B.,
LL.B., both of the class of 1960, and John J. Coffey, Thomas A. McNish and Edward O'Toole
of THE LAWYER'S Senior Staff. (Ed.)
